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Abstract
ESSAYS ON BANK ACQUISITIONS AND SYSTEMIC RISK
by
FARINDOKHT VAGHEFI
Adviser: Professor Gayle DeLong
This dissertation consists of two chapters on bank acquisitions and systemic risk.
Chapter 1 This chapter explores whether bank acquisitions are associated with systemic
risk-shifting. Acquisitions can form larger and more diversified firms and, as such, increase
the correlation of the acquirer’s investment with other banks and subsequently the probability
of their joint failure. This can be beneficial for the acquirer due to (implicit) government
“too-many-to-fail” guarantees. I find that bank acquisitions on average lead to an increase
in acquires’ systemic risk, which is in turn associated with an increase in firm value for
non-distressed acquisitions. Interestingly, congruent with the concept of “availability” in
behavioral finance, this usually favorable market reaction to acquisition-induced increase
in acquirers’ systemic risk turns into a significantly unfavorable one during crisis periods as
investors perceive a higher probability for tail events. I then, classify acquisitions into activity
diversifying and focusing to explore whether diversification is the mechanism for systemic
risk-shifting. I find that diversifying acquisitions that lead to an increase in the systemic risk
contribution of acquirers are associated with higher acquisition announcement abnormal
return for acquirers’ shareholders. Additionally, I find that diversifying acquisitions with
relatively well-performing acquirers exhibit higher degrees of systemic risk-shifting, regardless
of value creation. Overall, I put forward a potential incentive for diversifying acquisitions,
namely, systemic risk-shifting. These findings can bring value to banking supervisors by
v
identifying acquisitions with more likelihood of threatening financial stability.
Chapter 2 This chapter explores the source of systemic risk in financial institutions. I
utilize an aggregate measure of systemic risk and show that the operational risk component
drives systemic risk exposure and impacts future macroeconomic conditions. The operational
risk component of aggregate systemic risk forecasts economic downturns up to 12 months
into the future while the non-operational component has no predictive power. Operational
risk is measured as the residual risk remaining after accounting for market and credit risk
in equity returns.
Acknowledgments
I am very fortunate to have had access to many great people during my studies at The City
University of New York and during my work at The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. I
would like to thank everyone that supported me professionally and personally.
First of all, I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my committee chair Pro-
fessor Gayle DeLong for her guidance and very kind encouragement. I thank my committee
members, Professors Sonali Hazarika, Jian Hua and Karl Lang for their valuable suggestions
and comments on my research. I thank Professors Linda Allen, Ted Joyce, Armen Hov-
akimian, Jay Dahya, Lin Peng, and Robert Schwartz for their teaching and guidance. I also
thank Professor Joseph Onochie for his support and encouragement.
I would like to thank my dear friend and colleague, Daniela Scidá, for her academic and
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Chapter 1
Bank acquisitions: Do acquirers gain
private benefit at public cost?
1.1 Introduction
In this study we examine whether bank acquisitions are associated with an increase in acquir-
ers (systemic) risk and whether an increase in (systemic) risk is correlated with value creation
for acquirers shareholders. This is in line with the concept of systemic risk-shifting. M&A
activities can result in a more concentrated banking system, composed of a smaller number
of larger and more diversified firms. The dark side of diversification has long been a topic
of discussion in the academic literature (see, e.g., Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Beine, Cosma,
and Vermeulen, 2010; van Oordt, 2014). Many studies have argued that diversification of
risks at financial institutions, although beneficial on its own, can increase similarities among
firms and expose them to the same risks. This in turn can increase the likelihood of systemic
crisis and contribute to the fragility of the financial system (see, e.g., Berger, Demsetz, and
Strahan, 1999; DeNicoló and Kwast, 2002; Wagner, 2008; Wagner, 2010). Consolidation of
financial industry can change the financial network architecture and consequently increase
1
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the likelihood of systemic failures due to contagion of counterparty risk (see, e.g., Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015). Therefore, diversification is not always optimal and
does not necessarily help the safety and soundness of the financial system.
An increased debt capacity and risk reduction benefit of acquisitions may create an in-
centive for acquirers to take on more risk (see e.g., Lewellen, 19711; Shleifer and Vishny,
19922; DeNicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin, 20043), however, the impact of con-
solidations on fragility of financial system is argued to hold even if acquirers do not engage
in riskier activities.
Although dark for the financial system, acquisitions and the resulting diversification can
be beneficial to some individual firms, as acquisitions increase the extent of diversification and
subsequently similarity of consolidated firms. Similarity can in turn increase the likelihood of
joint survival and joint failure of the banks which is valuable due to existence of a (implicit)
regulatory “safety net” and “too-big-to-fail” or “too-many-to-fail” guarantees that give rise
to risk-shifting incentives (see e.g., Acharya, 2009). This does not necessarily imply that
the consolidated institutions will engage in any activity that is systemically more risky.
Even in absence of an increase in systemic risk, the fact that the acquisition results in
concentration of systemic risk in one institution may create a perception for the investors
that the consolidated institution would be more complex and difficult to resolve, therefore,
there is a higher chance for government interventions in case of default.
Since a bank can kill two birds with one stone through diversification (i.e., reduce its
non-systemic risk or increase expected return while increasing its systemic risk), the natural
question that follows is Do banks use diversification as a risk-shifting mechanism, particularly
1Lewellen (1971) argues that the more conglomerate the consolidation, the greater the expansion of the
partners debt-carrying ability pursuant to merger because diversification reduces earnings variability.
2Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that conglomerates may have a higher debt capacity as they can avoid
fire-sales in bad times that are ex ante a significant private cost of leverage.
3In their study of the effects of consolidation on the risk-taking incentives of individual financial firms,
DeNicoló et al. (2004) find that factors creating incentives for firms to take on more risk, appear to have
outweighed the risk reduction potentially achievable through diversification.
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 3
in the systemic dimension?
In this paper, we contribute to the aforementioned literature by studying whether the
acquisitions, that may lead to fragility of financial system and be costly to the taxpayers, is
associated with any private gains for acquirers shareholders. This analysis involves exploring
the effect of acquisition on risk and the relationship between acquisition-induced changes
in the acquirer’s risk and firm value. First, we revisit the prior literature finding that
M&As reduce non-systemic risk but increase systemic risk of the consolidated firm (see
e.g., Berger, 2000; Weiß, Neumann, and Bostandzic, 2014; Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan,
1999). Therefore, we study changes in acquirers’ risk from two angles: non-systemic and
systemic. The former refers to the sum of idiosyncratic and systematic risk, while the latter
to correlation of returns with the financial sector in the tail. Second, we investigate whether
the impact of systemic risk-shifting on firm value is different during crisis versus non-crisis
periods. This can occur due to the fact that our measure of value creation involves the
market perception of the fundamental value and, as such, it brings investors’ sentiments into
the equation. We also explore the change in systemic risk of combined entities, however since
this limits the sample to those acquisitions with a publicly-traded target and this sample
seems to have a different characteristics than the entire population, we dont find a significant
increase in systemic risk of combined entities. Although, for that sample we find that the
systemic risk of acquirers alone are higher than the acquirers and targets combined prior to
acquisition.
Third, we classify acquisitions of banking firms according to activity and geography
similarity (focusing) or dissimilarity (diversifying). We show that diversifying acquisitions are
the ones that create value for acquirers shareholders through systemic risk-shifting. Hence,
we put forward a crucial incentive for bidders to engage in diversifying acquisitions, namely,
systemic risk-shifting (see e.g., Acharya, 2009; Wagner, 2010). Forth, we study whether
diversifying versus focusing acquisitions are more likely to engage in and exhibit higher
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degree of systemic risk-shifting.
We focus on M&As within the USA involving deals announced and completed between
1986 and 2015. Non-systemic risk is estimated using the same methodology as in Amihud,
DeLong, and Saunders (2002) to calculate what they deem “Total Relative Risk” (TTR),
which is meant to include both idiosyncratic and systematic risks. We measure systemic
risk-shifting as an increase in market adjusted systemic-risk of the bidder resulting from
acquisition. In order to measure systemic risk we use Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and
Richardson (2016)’s Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES). In our study, systemic risk-shifting
exists when the Market Adjusted MES (MAES) is positive as a result of acquisition. As
in the literature, we measure value creation for acquirers’ shareholders using a Cumula-
tive Abnormal Return (CAR) measure. We follow DeLong (2001) to classify acquisitions
of banking firms according to activity and geography similarity (focusing) or dissimilarity
(diversifying).4
We find that acquirers’ systemic risk increases as the result of acquisition, although their
non-systemic risk does not significantly change. Our analysis indicate that the observed
increase in acquirers’ systemic risk is not the result of absorbing target’s systemic risk. We
also find that (ex-ante) the market reacts favorably to an increase in systemic risk in non-
crisis periods. Our results suggest that risk-shifting, particularly in the systemic dimension,
is a source of value creation for acquiring banks’ shareholders or, in other words, acquirers
take private benefit at public cost.
This finding does not generally apply to distressed acquisitions. Interestingly, we find
that market (ex-ante) reaction to an increase in systemic risk for acquisitions announced
during adverse macro conditions (or crisis periods) is significantly unfavorable. This is in
line with the concept of “availability” in behavioral finance, which promotes the idea that the
4This methodology examines the past movement of stock returns to determine whether partners engage
in different types of risks and are therefore involved in different types of activities. This methodology is
particularly relevant for studying the impact of systemic risk-shifting.
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realization of a tail event during crisis periods affects investors’ perception of the probability
of such events and make them particularly risk averse (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
Our results suggest that only diversifying (as opposed to focusing) acquisitions lead to
an increase in acquirers’ systemic risk contribution create value for acquirers’ shareholders.5
Furthermore, we find that systemic risk-shifting creates statistically and economically sig-
nificant value for acquirers’ shareholders only for diversifying acquisitions. Our results also
suggest that the value of systemic risk-shifting for acquirers’ shareholders has increased af-
ter the recent financial crisis. Taken all together, our findings could be particularly helpful
to banking supervisors by narrowing down their focus on acquisitions that have a higher
likelihood of threatening financial stability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we develop the
hypotheses. Section 1.3 presents the methodology for constructing measures of: systemic
risk, non-systemic risk and abnormal returns. It also presents the methodology for classifying
acquisitions into diversifying and focusing. Section 1.4 describes the M&A and equity return
data used in the empirical study. Empirical results are given in Section 1.5, and robustness
checks are given in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes. Variable definitions and theories from
the literature are presented at the end of the chapter.
1.2 Hypothesis
As stated in the Introduction, consolidation of individual financial institutions can be detri-
mental to the financial stability in at least two ways. First, consolidation can change the
financial network architecture, i.e., increase similarity of the nodes and density of inter-
connections and consequently increase the likelihood of systemic failures due to contagion
of counterparty risk. DeNicoló and Kwast (2002) show that consolidation in the financial
5Although MES is arguably a measure of systemic risk exposure, for our purposes we do not distinguish
between exposure and contribution.
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sector is associated with an increase in inter-dependencies of large and complex banking or-
ganizations. In their theoretical frameworks, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015)
and Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2012) show that diversification can
lead to either financial stability or fragility depending on factors such as structure and het-
erogeneity of firms’ financial robustness or on the magnitude of negative shocks. Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) argue that dense interconnections, corresponding to a
more diversified pattern of interbank liabilities, can serve as a mechanism for the propaga-
tion of shocks. Second, M&As can increase the acquirers’ incentive to take on more risk by
expanding the acquirers’ debt capacity (see, e.g., Lewellen, 1971).
M&As, however, can be beneficial to some individual firms due to increasing the likelihood
of government forbearance in case of default. Furthermore, M&As can lead to either decrease
in (non-systemic) risk of consolidated institution as a result of diversification or to a higher
expected return if the acquirer chose to increase risk in pursuit of higher expected returns.
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) find that in many cases, consolidating institutions chose
to move along the risk-expected return frontier and take most of the benefits of diversification
gains as higher returns by shifting their portfolios toward higher risk-higher expected return
investments.
Given these benefits (i.e., reduce non-systemic risk (or alternatively increase expected
return) while increasing systemic risk (or externalizing the risk)), we investigate whether
acquisitions lead to (systemic) risk-shifting and hypothesize that:
(H1): Bank acquisitions can lead to systemic risk-shifting.
One may argue that an increase in acquirers’ systemic risk is the result of absorbing tar-
get’s systemic risk and therefore, acquisitions do not impose additional costs to the economy.
To investigate this possibility, we consider the systemic risk of acquirer and target combined
before the acquisition and compare it to the risk of consolidated entity after the acquisition.
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We investigate the following hypothesis:
(H2): The consolidated entity will be riskier than the two banks separately.
We expect that the impact of systemic risk-shifting on firm value is different during crisis
versus non-crisis periods. In particular, we expect that the investors require higher compen-
sation for taking the tail risk during a crisis period. Hence, we hypothesize that:
(H3): Investors do not perceive systemic risk-shifting as favorably during crisis periods. More
generally, the relationship between acquirers’ value gain and systemic risk-shifting may
not hold for distressed acquisitions as other factors can impact the firm value in those
cases.
We tackle these hypotheses in two steps. First, we examine the change in acquirers’
risk as a result of acquisition. More specifically, we use a difference-in-difference framework
to estimate the change in (non-systemic and systemic) risks of a bidding bank before and
after an acquisition relative to a financial sector index. Second, we explore the relationship
between changes in risk of the acquirer and (abnormal) return for the acquirer’s shareholders
upon acquisition announcement. We also examine whether the market reacts to an increase
in acquirers systemic differently during adverse versus normal economic conditions and more
generally in the presence of distressed acquisitions.
Next, given that we hypothesized systemic risk-shifting in acquisitions is achieved through
increased similarities among institutions, we expect to observe more systemic risk-shifting in
diversifying acquisitions versus the focusing ones. Several studies have examined the value
of diversifying versus focusing mergers based on bidder’s abnormal stock return upon merger
announcement. These studies found that focusing mergers consistently created positive value
for bidders throughout 1960s to 1990s, while diversifying mergers destroyed value (see, e.g.,
Hubbard and Palia, 1999). DeLong (2001) confirms these findings and further shows that
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the loss in value for diversifying bidders is not the result of a wealth-transfer from bidders
to targets.
The natural question that follows is, given that diversifying mergers are destroying value,
what incentives do bidders have to engage in such value-destroying mergers? Several stud-
ies cite “managerial benefits” as the reason for overpaying and subsequently destroying
shareholders’ wealth through diversifying mergers (see, e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Don-
aldson and Lorsch, 1983; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia,
and Tehranian, 2003). While diversifying mergers may be on average value-destroying, not
all diversifying mergers lead to value destruction. We focus on value-creating diversifying
M&As and investigate the following hypotheses:
(H4): Systemic risk-shifting is an incentive for diversifying acquisitions and leads to value
creation for acquirers’ shareholders.
(H5): Acquisition-induced systemic risk-shifting is higher for diversifying versus focusing ac-
quisitions as a function of bidder pre-merger performance.
We test our fourth hypothesis by conducting three specific exercises. First, we examine
whether all diversifying acquisitions lead to value destruction. If they do not, we then
assess whether diversifying acquisitions create value through systemic risk-shifting. Second,
we investigate whether value creation through systemic risk-shifting is only associated with
diversifying acquisitions. Last, since a great deal of government interventions and bailouts
took place during the recent financial crisis and the potential value of systemic risk-shifting
is linked to such government forbearance, we test whether the value of systemic risk-shifting
increased after the recent financial crisis (as a consequence of those bailouts).
In our fifth hypothesis, we explore whether the degree of acquisition-induced systemic
risk-shifting is higher for diversifying versus focusing acquisitions regardless of the effect on
acquirers’ shareholders wealth. We study this relationship as a function of bidder’s pre-
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merger performance because other motives for diversifying acquisitions, such as managerial
benefits, are often associated with bidders’ poor performance prior to acquisition, while we
expect systemic risk-shifting motive to be associated with better performing bidders. To test
this hypothesis, we also control for a set of bidders’ and targets’ characteristics.
1.3 Methodology
To conduct our empirical analysis, we construct risk measures that capture non-systemic and
systemic risk of the acquiring bank, as well as a measure that captures the market reaction to
the acquisition announcement. Finally, we lay out the methodology to classify acquisitions
into diversifying and focusing.
1.3.1 Systemic risk measure
As in Weiß, Neumann, and Bostandzic (2014), we quantify changes in systemic risk due to
acquisition by estimating changes in bidding banks’ Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES). The
MES measure was first proposed by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2016)
in a 2010 version of the paper as a measure of systemic risk contribution. MES is calculated
as the average return of a bank during the x% worst days for the market (i.e., its losses in
the tail of the system’s loss distribution).
In order to control for other factors that could potentially impact systemic risk of ac-
quirers, we utilize a difference-in-difference framework. Similar to Weiß et al. (2014), we
construct a market adjusted MES measure (MAES) and estimate the changes in MES due
to bank mergers relative to the Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. We define
the financial sector index return as the weighted average return of all common stocks issued
by financial firms with SIC codes in the range of [6000,6800] that are reported in CRSP,
where the weight is the market capitalization of the firm. The changes in market adjusted
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systemic risk indicate the extent to which the bidding banks experience disproportionately
larger increases (or decreases) in their contribution to systemic risk than other firms in the
financial sector.
In our empirical study, we estimate the differences between the bidding banks’ pre- and
post- acquisition MAES as follows. First, we define a day t to belong to the pre-acquisition
period if it falls into the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement. Simi-
larly, we consider a day t to belong to the post-acquisition period if it falls into the interval
[+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.6 The MAES is estimated as the difference
between bidder’s MES and financial sector’s ES within the same time period. MAES of
bidder i is calculated as
MAES5%i = MES
5%
i − ES5%Index (1.1)
where 5% indicates that MES is calculated using the average return of a bidder during the
5% worst days of a financial sector index.







where MAES5%i,[−180,−11] and MAES
5%
i,[+11,+180] correspond to pre- and post-acquisition MAES
respectively. The [-180,-11] interval is relative to acquisition announcement, and [+11,+180]
interval is relative to acquisition completion.
6We follow the financial literature in the choice of the estimation window length to make our results more
comparable (see, e.g., Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders, 2002).
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1.3.2 Non-systemic risk measure
As in Amihud et al. (2002), we calculate the acquirer’s Non-Systemic Risk (NSR)7 as the
variance of the acquiring bank stock return relative to that of a financial sector index before
and after the acquisition. We define the NSR of acquirer i as
NSRi = V ar(Ri)/V ar(RIndex) (1.3)
where Ri is the daily stock return of acquirer i, and Index is a financial sector index as
defined in Section 1.3.1. We then calculate the change in NSRi as follows:
∆NSRi = NSRi,[+11,+180] −NSRi,[−180,−11] (1.4)
where NSRi,[−180,−11] and NSRi,[+11,+180] correspond to pre- and post- acquisition NSR re-
spectively. As in the previous subsection, the [-180,-11] interval is relative to acquisition
announcement, and [+11,+180] interval is relative to acquisition completion.
1.3.3 Market reaction measure
In order to gauge market reaction to acquisition announcement, or acquisition value creation
for acquiring bank’s shareholders, we estimate bidders’ abnormal returns upon the announce-
ment of acquisition. It is important to note that despite the pervasive use of this measure as
the typical acquisition value creation measure, the acquirer’s stock returns upon acquisition
announcement are only partly driven by how much value is fundamentally created because
the acquisition announcement also induces investors to reevaluate the acquirer’s stock in
light of the decision to merge, which might also bring investors’ sentiments into the equation
7This is refered to as “Total Relative Risk” in Amihud et al. (2002). To emphasize the distinction with
systemic risk, we refer to this as non-systemic risk. We ensured that non-systemic risk is orthognal to
systemic risk by regressing it on systemic risk and estimating its correlation with the residual.
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(Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah, 2005; Savor and Li, 2009).
This measure relies heavily on stock market responses, and, thus, investor choices un-
related to acquisition value may still influence its measurement. The distinction between
acquisition value creation and investors’ evaluation of it becomes important later in the pa-
per when we find macroeconomic conditions can impact investors’ perception of acquisition’s
value.
We use the standard event study methodology in the finance literature (see, e.g., DeLong,
2001; Brown and Warner, 1985) with the market model:
ARit = Rit − (αi + βiRMt) (1.5)
where ARit and Rit are the abnormal return and the return on stock i at time t respec-
tively, and RMt represents the return on the market at time t. We estimate the intercept
and slope coefficients, α and β, using daily returns collected 300 to 51 trading days before
the acquisition announcement. The market return is the value-weighted index of returns
including dividends from CRSP database. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of bank






where ARit is defined in equation (1.5) and t represents days with respect to the acquisition
announcement.
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1.3.4 Classification of M&As into Diversifying versus Focusing
In order to classify the acquisitions into activity diversifying and focusing, we use the cluster
analysis methodology outlined in DeLong (2001). We first classify the acquisitions based
on their geography diversification. Acquisitions with in-state acquirers are considered as
“geography focusing” and those with out-of-state acquirers, as “geography diversifying.” It
is important to classify the acquisitions by geography before classifying them by activity
because the latter classification is based on stock returns, which may have embedded some
geography diversification patterns.
Next, we classify the acquisitions into activity diversifying and focusing. We use Ward’s
method of cluster analysis to classify acquisitions based on a vector of monthly stock returns
for the last 12 months before the acquisition announcement.8,9 We choose to stop the cluster
formation when within-group variation explains about 75% of the total variation. Once firms
are clustered based on similarity of their stock returns, merging partners that fall into the
same cluster are considered as “activity focusing”, while those that fall into different clusters
are “activity diversifying”.
Finally, we sort the acquisitions into four groups using the previous classifications: Ge-
ography Focusing and Activity Focusing (GFAF), Geography Focusing and Activity Diver-
sifying (GFAD), Geography Diversifying and Activity Focusing (GDAF), and Geography
Diversifying and Activity Diversifying (GDAD).
Alternatively, we use Ward’s method to classify acquisitions without controlling first for
geography. This allows us to classify acquisitions into two categories “diversifying” and
“focusing” without prescribing the source of such diversification (i.e., activity versus geog-
8Ward’s method seeks to minimize the ratio of within-group variation to between-group variation. That
is, the squared Euclidean distances between the centroids of the various clusters. One gauge for determining
when to stop the process is to examine the amount of total variation, which is the sum of squared Euclidean
distances from each observation to the central mean, that a formation of clusters explains.
9As argued in the literature, stock returns reflect the pricing of various types of risk to which a firm
exposes itself, and therefore provide a measure of the similarity between two firms.
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raphy). In that sense, this classification is more flexible and its purpose will become clear in
Section 1.5.4.
1.4 Data
We use the SNL Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) datasets to build the sample of merging
financial institutions. We consider a subset of M&As involving deals announced and com-
pleted between 1986 and 2015 and require both buyer and seller to be located in the United
States. We define a acquisition as one firm obtaining more than 50% of the voting shares
of the target firm, or adding to a lower percentage in order to reach more than 50%. This
purchase results in the de-listing of the stock of the target firm. We only include mergers
where both bidding and target firms are financial institution with SIC codes in the range
[6000,6800].
As in Weiß et al. (2014), we exclude deals with an underlying deal value of less than 10
million U.S. dollars and also those with missing deal value. By using only large acquisitions,
our sample allows us to detect risk implications and valuation consequences more readily
than a sample including smaller transactions. Additionally, to avoid the distorting effects of
confounding events, we require an interval of 360 days between the completion of a deal and
the announcement of another transaction by the same acquirer. Since acquisition’s abnormal
return could be related to the transfer of wealth from taxpayers to merging entities in the
cases that U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assists a acquisition, we omit these
mergers from our analysis to prevent confounding effects. The resulting sample is comprised
of 780 acquisitions.
There are 573 unique acquirers associated with these 780 acquisitions in our sample.
427 of these acquirers appear only once in the sample while there are repeated acquistions
associated with the rest. Specifically, 101 acquirers have 2 acquisitions and 55 acquirers have
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more than 2 (but less than 5) acquisitions in our sample. Thirty three have 3, 8 have 4 and
4 have 5 acquisitions.10
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics.
This table reports summary statistics for CAR and characteristics of deal, acquirer and target. All variables
are defined in the Appendix. Deal value is stated in billions, while CAR, bidder and target pre-acquisition
performances are in percentages.
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
CAR 780 -0.41 -8.06 -3.84 2.57 6.91 6.19 -21.16 38.01
∆MAES 780 0.04 -1.49 -0.75 0.84 1.74 1.66 -16.30 9.73
∆NSR 780 -0.03 -4.39 -1.65 1.18 3.37 9.41 -57.22 157.60
Deal value 780 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.27 1.24 0.01 23.40
Relative size 780 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.23
Bidder pre-merger performance 780 -4.40 -30.75 -19.19 7.07 23.98 26.91 -71.66 274.03
Bidder assets 723 14.50 12.77 13.38 15.33 16.74 1.58 9.77 21.50
Bidder market-to-book 723 1.85 0.86 1.15 2.12 2.82 1.58 -0.34 26.47
Bidder non-interest income 575 1.73 0.29 0.55 1.34 1.97 7.27 -5.38 130.50
Target pre-merger performance 199 -8.44 -36.94 -24.21 6.94 23.48 25.15 -75.01 118.95
Target assets 618 12.53 11.15 11.69 13.25 14.16 1.39 6.99 18.64
We use monthly and daily stock return data from CRSP and CRSP/Compustat merged
databases. Financial accounting data and other acquisition characteristics are obtained from
the SNL database. Descriptive statistics of the data in the final sample are given in Table
1.1, and the total number and value of acquisitions announced in each year of our sample
are depicted in Figure 1.1.
The deal value of acquisitions in our sample ranges from 10 million to 23.4 billion dollars,
while target assets (book value) ranges from 1 million to 124 billion (the upper bound
corresponds to the acquisition of Phoenix Companies, Inc. with Kayne Anderson Rudnick
Investment Management, LLC in 2005). Bidders’ CAR upon acquisition announcement is
negative on average, ranging between roughly -21 to 38 percent. Both bidders’ and targets’
pre-acquisition performance are on average less than the industry’s index. However, as
10Future research could separate out banks that existed for the entire sample period.
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expected, targets’ pre-acquisition performance are, on average, worse than bidders.
Figure 1.1: Acquisitions count and value.
Acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and 2015. The year reported corresponds to the
acquisition announcement year. Deal values are reported in billions of dollars.
The top graph in Figure 1.1 shows that acquisition activity in the financial sector has
substantially increased since mid 80s peaking in 2006 right before the financial crisis. Bank
acquisitions slowed down after the crisis, but there has been growth since 2013 raising the
number of acquisitions to near pre-crisis levels. There are important differences observed
in M&A activities pre and post the 2008 financial crisis. Prior to the crisis, deals were
funded mostly by cash. In contrast, after the crisis, the majority of the deals had some stock
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component in response to increases in capital requirements by regulators. Furthermore,
some industry experts sustain that firms are now more strategic in their acquisitions and try
to stay away from those that would take them to additional regulations (i.e., crossing the
10B or 50B thresholds after which they would be subject to the Dodd-Frank Act). While
regulatory requirements seem to be stricter for bank acquisitions relative to prior years, we
continue to observe an increase in M&A activity.
The bottom graph in Figure 1.1 shows much higher acquisition value during crisis peri-
ods such as 1990, 2001 and 2008. This is expected as acquisition of large firms due to their
distress is more likely under adverse macroeconomic conditions. Table 1.2 presents the sum-
mary statistics for the acquisitions that were announced during crisis and those that were
announced during non-crisis periods, separately. Although bidders pre-acquisition perfor-
mance is only slightly different in crisis, targets pre-acquisition performance are substantially
lower. We also observe that during crisis periods, acquisitions lead to higher reduction in
acquirers’ non-systemic (∆NSR) and systemic (∆MAES) risks. Those acquisitions are also,
in general, more value-enhancing relative to the ones announced during non-crisis periods.
We will elaborate more on this observation in Section 1.5.
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 18
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics, crisis vs. non-crisis periods.
This table reports summary statistics for crisis (top panel) versus non-crisis (bottom panel) periods.
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
CAR 135 0.16 -9.99 -3.82 3.79 8.54 7.52 -14.08 36.12
∆MAES 135 -0.34 -2.88 -1.24 0.87 2.11 2.58 -16.30 5.78
∆NSR 135 -0.25 -3.98 -1.79 0.36 2.35 5.01 -13.04 30.72
Deal value 135 0.35 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.20 2.16 0.01 23.40
Relative size 135 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.23
Bidder pre-merger performance 135 -4.06 -35.10 -19.65 11.91 26.04 23.45 -65.18 72.20
Bidder assets 127 14.77 12.88 13.64 15.62 17.20 1.72 10.14 19.54
Bidder market-to-book 127 2.05 0.81 1.07 2.23 2.78 2.05 0.38 15.36
Bidder non-interest income 94 1.44 0.40 0.52 1.24 1.81 2.96 0.12 22.95
Target pre-merger performance 32 -11.86 -41.67 -28.74 5.65 24.98 25.82 -52.20 48.37
Target assets 96 12.62 11.40 11.84 13.44 14.07 1.39 7.48 18.64
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
CAR 645 -0.53 -7.87 -3.88 2.42 6.52 5.87 -21.16 38.01
∆MAES 645 0.11 -1.40 -0.64 0.84 1.68 1.38 -8.01 9.73
∆NSR 645 0.02 -4.55 -1.61 1.30 3.56 10.09 -57.22 157.60
Deal value 645 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.94 0.01 12.31
Relative size 645 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.77
Bidder pre-merger performance 645 -4.47 -30.19 -19.17 5.89 23.91 27.60 -71.66 274.03
Bidder assets 596 14.45 12.76 13.36 15.30 16.61 1.55 9.77 21.50
Bidder market-to-book 596 1.81 0.88 1.15 2.11 2.82 1.46 -0.34 26.47
Bidder non-interest income 481 1.79 0.28 0.56 1.35 1.97 7.84 -5.38 130.50
Target pre-merger performance 167 -7.78 -35.75 -22.56 6.94 20.29 25.05 -75.01 118.95
Target assets 522 12.51 11.14 11.63 13.23 14.16 1.39 6.99 17.88
1.4.1 Crisis periods and distressed acquisitions
In this study, we investigate whether an increase in acquirers systemic risk is associated with
value gain for acquirers shareholders. This is obviously not the only source of value gain for
bank acquisitions. Therefore, it is important to control for other sources of value creation to
the extent possible. As outlined in previous studies, bank acquisitions can create value by
reducing costs and/or increasing revenues. Cost reductions can be achieved in many ways,
such as improving efficiency, eliminating redundant managerial positions, closing overlapping
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bank branches, and consolidating back office functions. The opportunities for restructuring
and efficiency gains are potentially more in case of poor-performing or distressed targets.
So, in our study it is important to control for distressed acquisitions.
We identify distressed acquisitions in two different ways: acquisitions with relatively poor-
performing targets and acquisitions announced during a crisis period. Government-assisted
acquisitions would be a third type of distressed acquisitions; however, these acquisitions are
systematically excluded from the sample when we drop acquisitions with missing deal value.
This is not a concern since these acquisitions are motivated by special circumstances and we
would have excluded them anyway from our study.11
First, we control for acquisitions with relatively poor performing targets. We classify
the sample based on targets’ pre-acquisition performance, taking its 25th percentile over our
entire time period as the cutoff.12 We then define a dummy variable “low” equal to 1 if
target’s pre-acquisition performance is below 25th percentile and 0 otherwise. Second, we
account for acquisitions announced during crisis periods by including a crisis dummy equal
to 1 for acquisitions announced during the years 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011, and 0
otherwise. Distress during crisis periods could be mostly driven by adverse macroeconomic
conditions.
The crisis periods in our analysis correspond to those identified by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) plus the year 2011 to account for spillover effects into the
U.S. financial sector due to the European sovereign debt crisis.13 In fact, the FDIC report
11Based on FDIC Resolution Handbook, “A failing institution is absorbed into an acquiring institution
that receives FDIC assistance. In 1950, the FDIC was authorized by section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDI Act) of 1950 to implement assisted mergers. In 1982, when the FDI Act was amended,
the merger authority, as amended, was written into section 13(c) of the FDI Act. Such transactions allow the
FDIC to take direct action to reduce or avert a loss to the deposit insurance fund and to arrange the merger
of a troubled institution with a healthy FDIC insured institution without closing the failing institution.
Assisted mergers were the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporations preferred resolution method.”
12We use the 25th percentile as a cutoff for simplicity. Other more sophisticated approaches could be based
on clustering techniques.
13NBER identified downturns in our analysis time period includes: 1990Q3-1991Q1, 2001Q2-2001Q4 and
2008Q1-2009Q2.
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indicates more than 800 troubled banks in 2011. As a robustness check to adding 2011
to the periods identified by the NBER, in Section 1.6 we also run the analysis excluding
that year from the crisis periods and find the results to be robust to this alternative choice.
Admittedly, the early 2000s crisis is not a banking one and thus did not result in many bank
failures. However, we still see indications of distress in banks and other financial institutions’
portfolios as a result of the dotcom bubble burst in conjunction with other events during
2001 (e.g., terrorist attack of 9/11, and wars of Afghanistan and Iraq), which affected the
broader economic and business environments (see Jones and Critchfield, 2005). Therefore,
we keep the NBER classification for this year.
1.4.2 Diversifying and focusing mergers
Figure 1.2: Acquisitions count and value
Acquisitions announced and completed between 1988 and 2015. The year reported corresponds to the
acquisition announcement year.
In the second part of our analysis we categorize the acquisitions into diversifying and
focusing based on the correlation of bidder and target equity return. This substantially
reduce our sample size to those acquisitions with publicly-traded acquirer and target. De-
scriptive statistics of this sample are given in Table 1.3, and the total number of acquisitions
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announced in each year is depicted in Figure 1.2. This sample contains more M&As around
the dotcom bubble burst of early 2000s. The deal value of acquisitions in this sample ranges
from 10 million to 10.67 billion dollars, while target assets (book value) ranges from 74 mil-
lion to 80 billion dollars (the upper bound corresponds to the acquisition of Hudson City
Bancrop, Inc. by M&T Bank Corporation that was announced in 2012 and completed by
2015). Homogeneity of targets’ size in our sample is partly driven by the fact that we require
targets to be publicly-traded. Bidders’ CAR upon acquisition announcement is negative on
average, ranging between roughly -21 to 12 percent. Both bidders’ and targets’ pre-merger
performance are on average less than the industry’s index. Interestingly, MAES of bidders
as the result of acquisition is negative on average; however, it ranges from about -5.6 to 3.2
percent.
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of the sample with public target.
This table reports summary statistics for CAR and characteristics of deal, acquirer and target. All variables
are defined in the Appendix. Deal value is stated in billions, while CAR, bidder and target pre-merger
performances are in percentages.
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
CAR 193 -2.13 -9.92 -5.44 1.79 4.69 5.77 -21.16 12.63
∆MAES 193 -0.11 -1.46 -0.82 0.64 1.42 1.25 -5.56 3.24
∆NSR 193 0.25 -3.29 -1.30 0.84 2.30 6.18 -22.28 48.88
Deal value 193 0.37 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.48 1.32 0.01 10.67
Relative size 193 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.63
Bidder pre-merger performance 193 -8.10 -30.87 -19.98 2.65 15.74 18.20 -46.75 55.86
Bidder assets 188 14.74 12.86 13.70 15.76 16.82 1.46 11.21 18.21
Bidder market-to-book 188 1.67 0.85 1.09 2.10 2.62 0.80 0.42 5.98
Bidder non-interest income 180 1.10 0.24 0.53 1.45 1.90 1.32 -0.20 15.12
Target pre-merger performance 192 -8.59 -36.15 -23.51 5.06 23.48 25.17 -75.01 118.95
Target assets 193 13.29 11.93 12.44 13.85 14.82 1.25 10.70 17.59
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1.5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we jointly study hypotheses (H1), (H2) and (H3) in sections 1.5.1, 1.5.2
and 1.5.3. First, we look at the change in acquirer’s non-systemic and systemic risk as the
result of acquisition in a univariate framework. Second, we explore the relationship between
changes in risk and acquirer’s value upon acquisition announcement. Then, we investigate
hypotheses (H4) and (H5) on the limited sample in sections 1.5.4 and 1.5.5.
1.5.1 Effect of bank acquisitions on acquirers’ risk
We first examine the change in acquiring banks’ systemic risk as a result of acquisition
relative to a financial sector index. This test is based on the market adjusted expected
shortfall measure (MAES) defined in equation (1.1) of Section 1.3. We perform a t-test for
the means of MAES, pre- and post- acquisition, and for the change in MAES resulting from
acquisition (∆MAES) as defined in equation (1.2) of Section 1.3. The null hypothesis is that
the mean is equal to zero. Table 1.5 presents the results.
We start by looking at the entire sample and find no significant change in MAES. Next,
we split the sample into crisis and non-crisis periods to accommodate for potentially different
motives for bank acquisitions in crisis periods. For non-crisis periods we find that ∆MAES
is positive and significant, indicating that bank acquisitions indeed lead to a significant
increase in the MAES of bidders. This effect, however, disappears during the crisis periods.
Our results are different from those of Weiß et al. (2014). They find that the change in
systemic risk contribution of bidders is not significantly different from their non-merging
competitors. Their conclusion could be driven by not separating the analysis in crisis and
non-crisis periods.
We next examine the change in bidders’ non-systemic risk as the result of acquisition using
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the methodology outlined in Section 1.3.2 for NSR and ∆NSR. In Table 1.6 we conduct an
analogous exercise to the one carried out for systemic risk. The results suggest that, in
general, bank acquisitions do not lead to any statistically significant change in acquirers’
NSR. In summary, we find that bank acquisitions lead to an increase in acquiring banks’
systemic risk (during non-crisis periods) while their individual risk does not significantly
change.
Table 1.7 presents the same analysis controling for all distressed acquisitions. We observe
similar results in that bank acquisitions lead to an increase in acquiring banks’ systemic risk
(for non-distressed acquisitions) while their individual risk does not significantly change.
Univariate analysis of acquirers’ risk
In this section, we perform univariate analysis and examine the change in bidders’ systemic
and non-systemic risk by some of bidder and deal characteristics. Table 1.8 presents the
analysis by tertiles of deal value. Panel A includes non-distressed and panel B distressed
acquisitions. Interestingly, the acquisition-induced change in acquirers’ systemic risk is sta-
tistically significant for medium deal values, but the change is in opposite directions for
distressed vs. non-distressed acquisitions. This could be an evidence that becoming too-
big-to-fail is not the only driver of an increase in acquirers’ systemic risk. The change in
acquirers’ non-systemic risk is statistically insignificant for non-distressed acquisitions across
all tertiles of deal value, however it is significantly negative for distressed acquisitions with
high and medium deal values.
Table 1.8 presents the change in bidders’ systemic and non-systemic risk by tertiles of
bidders’ total assets. Change in systemic risk is consistent with observations by tertiles
of deal value in that the bidders with medium assets seems to have higher and statistically
significant increase in systemic risk relative to those with low and high total assets. Decrease
in non-systemic risk, however, seems to be higher in magnitude and statistically significant for
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acquirers with low total assets. This is consistent with the intuition that smaller firms benefit
more from diversification. Although, this is not the case for distressed acquisitions. The
results indicate that large and medium acquirers benefit more from a distressed acquisition
in terms of reducing their (non-systemic) risk.
Table 1.10 presents the acquisition-induced change in acquirers’ systemic and non-systemic
risk by tertiles of bidders’ pre-merger performance. The results indicate that for non-
distressed acquisitions, an increase in systemic risk is mostly associated with high bidder
performance while a significant decrease in non-systemic risk is observed for low-performing
bidders.
Overall, the analysis in this section indicates that an increase in systemic risk is associated
with medium deal value and medium acquirer’s total assets, but high bidder’s performance.
Higher diversification benefit in terms of reducing non-systemic risk is observed for bidders
with low total assets and low performance. Note that the observations for non-distressed
acquisitions do not generally hold for distressed ones.
1.5.2 Systemic risk of acquirer and target combined
In the previous section, we found that systemic risk of acquirers on average increased after an
acquisition, although, their non-systemic risk does not significantly change. In this section,
we consider the systemic risk of acquirers and targets combined before the acquisition and
compare it to the risk of consolidated entity after the acquisition to test whether an increase
in acquirers’ systemic risk is the result of absorbing the targets systemic risk. If the systemic
risk of the consolidated entity is less than the combined risk of acquirer and target before the
acquisition, one could perhaps conclude that acquisitions do not impose more costs to the
economy. As mentioned earlier, Weiß, Neumann, and Bostandzic (2014) find an increase in
systemic risk of acquiring banks’, combined banks’ and overall financial system as the result
of M&As. We investigate the following hypothesis:
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(H3): The consolidated entity will be riskier than the two banks separately.
To assess this hypothesis, we compare weighted average of acquirer’s and target’s MAES
before acquisition announcement to MAES of consolidated entity after acquisition comple-
tion. Weighted MAES of acquirer and target before acquisition is determined by adding
market value of acquirer and target and computing daily percent returns as follows.
ReturnA+T,t = Ln[1 + ((MVA,t +MVT,t)(MVA,t−1 +MVT,t−1))/(MVA,t−1 +MVT,t−1)]
(1.7)
Where A is the acquirer, T is the target and MV is the market value of equity.
One caveat to this analysis is that the sample size is drastically reduced (to 199 acqui-
sitions) as estimating this measure requires both acquirer and target to be publicly-traded
firms. Furthermore, this limited sample of acquisitions might not be a random sample and
could have different characteristics compared to the rest of acquisitions in our sample.
Table 1.11 presents the results. Pre-acquisition MAES is the weighted MAES of acquirer
and target, whereas, post-acquisition MAES is the MAES of combined entity. ∆MAES
is the difference of the two. Consistent with previous results, we find that the combined
systemic risk of acquirer and target increases for acquisitions announced in non-crisis periods,
although the difference is not statistically significant. As pointed out earlier, this could be
due to different characteristics of this limited sample. To investigate this further, we perform
three analysis as follows.
First, in panel B, we look at the MAES of acquirers (only) for the same sample. The
results show that this sample is indeed different from the entire population as we observe
a (statistically insignificant) decrease in systemic risk of acquirers unlike the overall results
in Table 1.5.14 Interestingly, we observe that the increase in systemic risk is even higher
14Since we observe that the acquisitions envolving a pulbic target seem to behave differently, as a robustness
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on average when the combined systemic risk of target and acquirer is considered. So it is
unlikely that the increase in acquirers’ systemic risk is the result of absorbing the target’s
systemic risk.
Second, I divide this limited sample of 199 acquisitions according to whether the target
was distressed or not. Panel A of Table 1.12 presents the MAES of acquirers and targets
combined with this categorization. The MAES for acquisitions of a non-distressed target is
positive and larger than those acquisitions announced in a non-crisis period, however still
statistically insignificant.
The results presented in the first analysis is in line with the empirical results presented
in Weiß et al. (2014). in that they also find a larger change in systemic risk of combined
entity relative to acquirer only. However, while they find a significant increase in combined
entitys systemic risk over 1991-2009, our results in first and second analysis indicates an
overall decrease in systemic risk. In order to investigate the driver of this difference, we first
conduct the same analysis limiting the sample to acquisitions announced and completed from
1991-2009 to be comparable. Panel B of Table 1.12 presents the results. MAES is positive
for overall sample and statistically significant for acquisitions with non-distressed targets.
Weiß et al. (2014) also exclude serial acquirers from their main analysis. We do the same
and run the analysis again. Panel C of Table 1.12 presents the results which are similar to
Panel B. One remaining major difference is that we do the analysis using market-adjusted
change in MES, while Weiß et al. (2014) do not consider market adjustment in their analysis
of combined entity. Panel D of Table 1.12, presents the change in systemic risk of combined
entity without market adjustment. The MES is significantly positive for all acquisitions in
line with the results presented in Weiß et al. (2014).
Third, in order to investigate whether this limited sample is different from the rest,
check, we will remove them from our sample and test whether the results hold. This will likely strengthen
our results.
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we compare the MAES and NSR of acquirers in two sub-samples of acquisitions with a
public target (i.e. the limited sample) and those with a non-public target. The results
are presented in Tables 1.13 and 1.14. For acquisitions announced in a non-crisis period,
MAES of those with a public target is negative, whereas MAES of those with a non-public
target is significantly positive. NSR is also different across two sub-samples. It is positive
for acquirers of a public target, while it is negative for the rest of the sample. Note NSR
is statistically insignificant in both sub-samples. This conclusion holds for all as well as
non-crisis sub-samples. Overall, this analysis suggests that acquisitions with a public target
have different characteristics than those with a non-public target.
1.5.3 Market reaction to systemic risk-shifting
Market reaction (CAR)
We start by computing CAR for each acquirer, as outlined in Section 1.5.3, to investigate
whether acquirer’s shareholders benefit from acquisition-induced changes in acquirer’s risk.
Table 1.15 presents the mean of CAR for different time periods and target pre-acquisition
performance. We find that CAR is on average negative and statistically significant, except for
the crisis periods. This is in line with the results of a number of studies on bank acquisitions
(see, e.g., Hawawini and Swary, 1990; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994).
Interestingly, the acquisitions announced during crisis periods, in general, create more
value for the acquirers’ shareholders. This is consistent with the notion that acquisition gains
must outweigh presumably high capital reallocation costs during crisis periods. During crisis
periods, acquirers can benefit from acquiring assets at distressed prices. A lower number of
potential bidders and higher number of potential targets during crisis periods may also
lead to higher acquisition value for the acquirers’ shareholders (see James and Wier, 1987).
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Consistent with our results in Table 1.15, 15 Beltratti and Paladino (2013) find that abnormal
returns for bank acquirers are zero on average after announcements.
We also consider categorizing the sample along targets’ pre-acquisition performance due
to the reasons outlined in section 1.4.1. We choose the 25th percentile of targets’ pre-
acquisition performance as threshold and denote the two groups as “Poor Target Perf.” and
“Good Target Perf.” Table 1.15 shows that in the case of poor performing targets the value
destroyed is much larger and statistically significant (except for the crisis periods), whereas
for good performing targets we cannot reject the null that CAR is different from zero.
Control variables
In our analysis, we control for acquirer, target and deal characteristics that the literature
has identified to be important to the announcement outcome. Namely, relative size of target
to bidder, bidder pre-acquisition performance, geographic diversification, market-to-book
ratio, bidder assets, target assets, bidder non-interest income, and deal type. The definition
of control variables is outlined in the Appendix.
We control for relative size of the target to bidder as previous studies have found it is
positively related to CAR (see, e.g., James and Wier, 1987; DeLong, 2001). There is also
evidence of a significant relationship between acquisition diversification and value creation
in the literature. For instance, DeLong (2001) finds that diversifying acquisitions (both
geographic and functional) tend to create less value for acquirers’ shareholders relative to
focusing acquisitions. Hence, we also control for this source of value creation by defining a
categorical variable for geographic expansion, which is set to 0 for “In market”, 1 for “Partial
overlap” and 2 for “Market expansion.”
Another acquirer’s pre-acquisition characteristics that could influence acquisition’s value
15The acquirers’ CAR associated with acquisitions during a crisis period is positive (although statistically
insignificant), whereas, for those acquisitions during other periods is significantly negative.
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creation is market-to-book ratio. We account for acquirer’s market-to-book ratio to control
for the bank’s investment opportunity set (see Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Higher market-
to-book could either motivate the bank to engage in too-risky acquisitions, or prevent them
from increasing risk because the more valuable banks possess fewer incentives to act rashly
(see Keeley, 1990).
In order to account for the possibility that the market could have anticipated the increase
in systemic risk as the result of acquisition ex-ante, we look into acquisition characteristics
that could have indicated acquisition-related increase in systemic risk at the time of deal
announcement. In the academic literature, higher non-interest income (i.e., non-core activ-
ities like investment banking and trading) has been associated with a higher contribution
to systemic risk relative to traditional banking (i.e., deposit taking and lending) (see, e.g.,
Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia, 2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007).
Therefore, the deal type could signal systemic risk implications of the acquisition at the time
of the deal announcement. The types of acquisitions in our sample can be categorized into
five main groups of companies: “bank and thrift,” “specialty finance,” “financial technol-
ogy,” “securities and investment,” and “insurance.” If the market indeed reacts positively
to an increase in systemic risk contribution in benign periods, one would expect CAR to be
higher for “securities and investment” deals relative to other types of acquisitions.
Main results
In order to empirically assess the relationship between systemic risk-shifting and acquirer’s
value, we first need to disentangle the impact of other sources of acquisition value creation.
For instance, acquisitions that involve a distressed target, suffering from clear deficiencies,
could gain value through restructuring and turnaround of the target. Koetter et al. (2007)
argue that not accounting for distressed mergers in bank acquisition studies might lead to
biased conclusions.
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Furthermore, there is evidence in the literature supporting the notion that even “non
government-assisted” acquisitions during crisis could be motivated by distress or higher prob-
ability of failure. Dunn, Intintoli, and McNutt (2015) find that targets are valued lower and
are less efficient relative to their acquirers during crisis versus normal times. Perhaps more
importantly, investors’ risk aversion or heightened uncertainty (see Beltratti and Paladino,
2013) during crisis periods might lead to different valuations of mergers. In particular, we
expect this risk aversion or uncertainty to be more evident in case of acquisition-induced
changes in systemic risk.
In order to account for both distressed acquisitions and also investors’ differential val-
uation during crisis periods, we proceed in two ways in our model specification. We first
consider overall distressed acquisitions and construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if a ac-
quisition is announced in a crisis period or target’s pre-acquisition performance is below the
25th percentile, and 0 otherwise. This “distress” dummy is basically equal to the summation
of the dummies “crisis” and “Low.” Then, in a second exercise, we disentangle between
these two sources of distress to allow for the possibility that alternative sources of distress
can interact differently with changes in risk and, thus, impact CAR in different manners.
In our sample of 780 acquisitions, about 80% (i.e., 606 acquisitions) are non-distressed.
135 acquisitions were announced in a crisis period and 50 acquisitions involve a relatively
low-performing target. So, only 11 acquisitions are common between “Low” and “crisis”
dummy variables.
The main results are presented in Table 1.16 and Table 1.17. In the first table, we use
the distress dummy, which accounts for both crisis periods and relatively low pre-acquisition
performance; while in the second table we disaggregate the sources of distress by means of
the dummies, crisis and low. Since some control variables have many missing observations
we add them in three steps. Specification (1) is the baseline that includes all the 780 ac-
quisitions, specification (2) incorporates additional bidder characteristics and the geographic
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diversification dummy, and specification (3) adds bidder non-interest income and target as-
sets. Specification (4) adds to specification (2) the deal type categorical variable discussed
in Section 1.5.3. We consider specification (2) as our main specification since it gives a good
compromise between additional control variables and sample size.
We find two sets of important results that relate to hypotheses (H1) and (H2) respec-
tively.16 First, in both tables the coefficient of ∆MAES is positive and significant at a 1%
level in specifications (2) and (4), and at a 5% level in specification (3). Therefore, an in-
crease in systemic risk of bidders as a result of acquisition is positively correlated with an
increase in firm value (CAR). This supports our first hypothesis that acquisitions in general
can lead to systemic risk shifting. At the same time, we find no evidence of a statistically
significant relationship between CAR and acquisition-induced change in acquirer’s individ-
ual risk (∆NSR). Second, for distressed acquisitions we do not observe the same relationship
between CAR and change in systemic risk. In Table 1.16, the interaction term between the
distress dummy and ∆MAES is negative and significant at a 5% level, after controlling for
other factors such as geographic diversification, bidder assets and target assets. In fact, the
significantly negative relationship confirms that one should control for distressed acquisitions
in this study.
As mentioned earlier, our “distress” measure includes the acquisitions with either low
performing target or the ones that are announced during crisis periods. Therefore, in order
to further explore what are the underlying drivers of opposite market reactions to an increase
in systemic risk, in Table 1.17 we replace the “distress” dummy by it’s components (i.e., “low”
and “crisis” dummies). Interestingly, we find that although investors value the increase in
16As explained earlier, we categorize the acquisitions based on targets’ pre-acquisition performance. How-
ever, since this measure is only available when the target is a publicly traded company, our estimation sample
is substantially reduced if we discard acquisitions with private targets. In order to take advantage of the
entire sample, we assume that private targets’ pre-acquisition performance are at the median. This leads
to the higher number of observations in our main analysis. However, we perform two robustness checks in
Table 1.26 to ensure this does not drive our results.
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systemic risk and react positively to those acquisitions in normal times, market reaction to
such acquisitions announced during crisis is significantly unfavorable. This result could be
attributed to the fact that investors place lower probability on tail risk in benign periods,
relative to crisis periods when the tail risk is just materialized. This is in line with the
concept of “availability,” pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) which states that the
easier it is for us to recall instances in which something has happened, the more likely we
will assume it is. This will be discussed in further details in Section 1.5.3.
For acquisitions with low performing targets we do not observe the same relationship be-
tween CAR and change in systemic risk. Although the effect is bigger in magnitude (almost
twice the coefficient of the interaction term with the “crisis” dummy, except for specification
(1)), it is not statistically significant. This implies that acquisitions with poor performing
targets do not create value through systemic risk-shifiting and can be attributed to other
opportunities for value creation in those cases. As outlined in previous studies, bank ac-
quisitions can increase value by reducing costs and/or increasing revenues. Cost reductions
can be achieved in many ways, such as improving efficiency, eliminating redundant manage-
rial positions, closing overlapping bank branches, and consolidating back office functions.
The opportunities for restructuring and efficiency gains are potentially more in case of poor
performing targets. This result provides evidence in support of our second hypothesis.
In addition to our main results, it is worth mentioning a couple of interesting observa-
tions based on the geographic diversification dummy and the deal type categorical variable.
Geographic diversification has been the prevalent force underlying the acquisition movement
since 1980s. As the restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking were removed, many
banks expanded their operations.17 Consistent with an efficiency rationale for acquisition
value creation, our results confirm the findings of DeLong (2001) and Akkus, Cookson, and
17The lifting of restrictions was followed by the approval of Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994, which in June 1995 allowed nationwide interstate banking through holding company
banks and as of September 30, 1997, allowed interstate branch banking.
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 33
Hortacsu (2015) that acquisition value is greater when it is more focused in nature and when
there is a greater overlap between acquirer and target markets.
Regarding deal type, our results in specification (4) of both tables indicate significantly
higher CAR for “securities and investment” deals, whereas the relationship with other types
of acquisitions are not statistically significant in Table 1.17 and are only significant at a 10%
level in Table 1.16 (except for financial technology deal, which is not significant in either
table). As mentioned earlier, these types of activities are associated with higher systemic
risk contribution and, as such, this result provides evidence supporting our main finding
that the market rewards acquisition-induced increase in systemic risk. Furthermore, since
non-interest income is associated with systemic risk contribution, accounting for bidders’
non-interest-income before the acquisition can to some extent control for the bidders’ pre-
acquisition systemic risk contribution. Although the relationship is positive in specification
(3), it is not statistically significant.
Acquisitions during a crisis period
As discussed earlier, we expect the acquisitions announced during a crisis period to exhibit
different characteristics. They generally involve acquirers that are sufficiently strong, de-
spite a global liquidity drought, to take advantage of forced sales from weaker competitors
(see Beltratti and Paladino, 2013). In previous section, we found that market reaction to
acquisitions announced during a crisis is negatively correlated with ∆MAES. This could be
attributed to the concept of “availability,” however could also be explained by alternative
hypotheses.
One explanation could be that the relation between ∆MAES and CAR during a crisis
period is driven by other endogeneous factors that are influenced by a crisis. For example,
heightened uncertainty in a crisis could be relatively more for larger or diversifying acqui-
sitions that are at the same time associated with a higher ∆MAES. Beltratti and Paladino
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(2013) find that during a crisis period, abnormal returns for bank acquirers are zero on
average after announcements due to opacity of target’s asset value. However, cumulative
abnormal returns are positive after the date of completion as the acquisition due diligence to
certify the value of target is completed and conclusions are announced. This is another main
difference of an acquisition in a crisis vs. non-crisis times that might impact our results, i.e.
the acquisition value creation is not reflected at the time of announcement, but later on as
the acquisition is completed. Hence, the negative market reaction to an increase in systemic
risk contribution could be the result of hightened opacity that is expected to be even higher
for larger or diversifying acquisitions during a crisis period.
In general, signaling incentives can develop in any situation in which bidders benefit from
uninformed outsiders perceiving high values after the takeover. In other words, acquirer’s
profit does not only depend on its actual value of the target, but also on uninformed outsiders’
perception of the value. Such signaling incentives are widespread and could arise from
bidders’ financing needs, use of collars in equity payments, managerial myopia, and exposure
to liquidity shocks (see Liu, 2012). Due to higher uncertainty in crisis periods, the bidders
have higher incentive to use signaling strategies. Degree of signaling incentive could be
correlated with the factors influencing ∆MAES and therefore lead to negative correlation of
abnormal return with ∆MAES.
To further investigate these hypotheses, we can do as follows. First, we can estimate the
abnormal returns around the completions of acquisitions announced in a crisis and see how
investors react to an increase in ∆MAES. Second, we can include a measure of target opacity
to control for this important determinant of abnormal returns during the crisis periods and
potential endogeneities arising from it.
Table 1.18 presents the results for the sample of acquisitions announced during a crisis
period. This leads to drastic reduction in sample size and in contrast to our main results in
Table 1.17, we do not observe a statistically significant unfavorable reaction to an increase
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in ∆MAES. There are a few interesting observations. First, in regression (3), relative size
is statistically and economically significant. This is consistent with our prior that relatively
larger deals impose much higher risk and uncertainty during a crisis period versus other
times. Second, the bidder non-interest income is associated with a higher abnormal return.
Third, securities & investment deals are associated with higher abnormal return, consistent
with our finding for the overall sample.
Table 1.19 presents the results for the sample limited to acquisitions announced during
2001 only. ∆MAES is significantly negative for this sample. This could be driven by the fact
that 2001 is not a banking crisis. As a future research direction, I will look into what factors
during this specific crisis are contributing to different results from other crisis periods.
Too-big-to-fail motive
As discussed earlier, M&As can lead to an increase in acquirers’ systemic risk contribution
due to becoming larger and more interconnected. An increase in size and interconnections
can create value for acquirers’ shareholders as market percieves higher probability of using
governments too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidies in case of default. Therefore, larger banks
tend to pose greater risks on the system, independent of any changes in their non-systemic
(individual bank) risks. Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) and other studies find that banking
organizations were willing to pay an added premium for mergers that would put them over
the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the threshold for being TBTF. In this section,
we investigate whether the value created for acquirers’ shareholders through an increase in
systemic risk is driven by becoming TBTF.
Since TBTF is not officially defined by law or regulatory policy, its impact relies upon
judgments of regulators and the market perception. We control for TBTF impact in 3
different ways as follows.
First, we control for the change in size of the merged institution (∆Size) defined as
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the change in the book value of total assets of the merged entity one quarter after deal
completion relative to acquirer’s book value of total assets one quarter before the acquisition
announcement.
Second, we define TBTF 1 dummy variable to be equal to 1 if as the result of acquisition,
the acquirer moves up to the top size quartile (based on book value of total assests) after
the deal completion from any other size quartile prior to acquisition announcement and 0
otherwise. This approach results in 50 acquisitions with TBTF motive versus 495 other
acquisitions for which we have the total assets in the dataset.
Third, we follow Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) to set the TBTF threshold. They find
that a TBTF threshold of $100 billion in total assets was perceived by the market as an
important criterion for becoming TBTF during the period of the 1990s and early 2000s. It
also provides a good dividing line for separating organizations with a national scope from
regional organizations. We define TBTF 2 to be equal to 1 if the acquisition results in an
institution with more than $100 billion in total assets and 0 otherwise. This results in only
9 TBTF acquisitions in our sample.
Table 1.20 presents the results. Regression (1) indicates that neither the coefficient of
∆Size nor its interaction with ∆MAES are statistically significant, while our main results
are robust (i.e., the coefficient of ∆MAES is positive while the coefficient of its interaction
with Distress dummy is negative and both are statistically significant). In regression (2), the
coefficient of TBTF 1 is signifiantly negative and its interaction with ∆MAES is statistically
insignificant. Regression (3)’s result is consistent with the literature in that becoming TBTF
leads to a premium in market valuation of the acquisition, however its interaction with
∆MAES is negative and statistically insignificant. In all cases, while we control for TBTF
motive, our main results hold and we do not find any evidence that our results are driven
by the merged entity becoming TBTF. Hence, we conclude that the value creation through
acquisition-induced increase in systemic risk is not limited to the cases where acquirers
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become TBTF.
1.5.4 The value of diversifying acquisitions
Distribution of acquisitions value
As noted in Section 1.2, given our hypothesis that systemic risk-shifting in an acquisition is
achieved through increased correlation of institution with other firms in financial sector, we
expect to observe more systemic risk-shifting in diversifying acquisitions versus the focusing
ones. In this section, we test this hypothesis. Given that extant literature has characterized
diversifying M&As as value destroying, we start our analysis by investigating whether all
diversifying acquisitions lead to value destruction. First, in Table, 1.21 we look at the
means and p-values of CAR, along with other descriptive statistics, for all acquisitions in
our sample. These are classified in four possible groups according to activity and geography
diversification. As explained in the methodology section, we first group the acquisitions into
geography focusing and diversifying, and then consider the activity dimension using cluster
analysis. It is worth noting that we perform our cluster analysis before applying any data
filter. Specifically, we perform cluster analysis for all acquisitions where 12 months stock
returns prior to announcement are available for both buyer and target. This initial sample
includes 1128 acquisitions. After applying the filters outlined in the data section, we are left
with 193 acquisitions.18
Table 1.21 suggests that CAR is, in general, significantly negative. Acquisitions with both
dimensions of diversification (activity and geography) are more value destroying, whereas for
activity and geography focusing acquisitions we cannot reject the null that acquisition value
is different from zero. The latter is also the case for geography diversifying and activity
focusing acquisitions, although it could be driven by the small sample size in this category.
18Requiring an interval of 360 days between the completion of a deal and the announcement of another
transaction by the same acquirer is one of the main limiting filters.
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If we only classify acquisitions in diversifying and focusing without controlling for geogra-
phy, as in Table 1.22, we see that value destruction is on average much higher for diversifying
than for focusing acquisitions. This broader classification allows us to avoid the aforemen-
tioned small sample size issue in a given acquisition group.
Overall, the results in the previous tables are in line with the literature, which supports
that diversifying acquisitions are on average value destroying. However, if we look at other
descriptive statistics in these tables, we see that dispersion is relatively high in all categories,
the range is large, and all maximum values are positive. This suggests that not all diversi-
fying acquisitions are value destroying. In order to further investigate these observations, in
Figure 1.3, we take a closer look at the distribution of CAR for diversifying versus focusing
acquisitions, rather than average values. As in Table 1.22, we classify acquisitions using clus-
ter analysis without first controlling by geography in order to look at diversification more
broadly. Although diversifying acquisitions on average destroy value, there is a consider-
able proportion (36% of diversifying acquisitions) that actually creates value for acquirers’
shareholders. Our focus in this paper is to better understand the source of value creation for
diversifying acquisitions. More specifically, we investigate whether diversifying acquisitions
create value through systemic risk-shifting.
Main results
The main results are presented in Table 1.23. We test whether diversifying acquisitions gain
value through systemic risk-shifting. We use measures of activity and geography diversifica-
tion separately and jointly. Specifications (1)-(3) account for both activity and geography
diversification using three dummy variables as well as their interactions with acquisition-
induced change in acquirers’ systemic risk contribution (∆MAES). We are in the benchmark
case of geography & activity focusing acquisitions (GFAF) when all three dummy variables
are equal to 0. Before adding ∆MAES into the analysis, we provide a baseline case in speci-
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fication (1) and check that our results are broadly aligned with the literature. The results in
(1) indicate that the return on GDAD acquisitions is lower than that of GFAF acquisitions,
although not statistically significant.
In specification (2) we incorporate ∆MAES into the analysis, and control for crisis periods
by adding a level and an interaction term with ∆MAES. The latter is included to account
for the fact that the market reaction to changes in systemic risk for acquisitions announced
during adverse macroeconomic conditions may differ from normal times. As expected, the
coefficient of this interaction is negative, although not significant.
Our main finding is provided in specification (3) and is centered around the interaction
terms between the diversification dummies and ∆MAES. A positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient on a given interaction term indicates that the type of acquisition (e.g.,
GDAD) creates value (i.e., CAR> 0) through increasing systemic risk contribution (i.e.,
∆MAES> 0). We find that GFAD and GDAF acquisitions that engage in systemic risk-
shifting have an overall positive impact on shareholders’ value, leading to about 1.097ppt
(−0.642 + 1.739) and 2.114ppt (−1.171 + 3.285) higher abnormal return relative to GFAF
acquisitions respectively. Statistically, these values are higher since only the interaction
terms are significant (at a 10% and 5% level respectively). The value created by GDAD
acquisitions through systemic risk-shifting is also positive and significant at a 1% level (p-
value=0.010). These results suggest that diversifying acquisitions in some capacity, either
activity or geography, create value for acquirers’ shareholders through systemic risk-shifting.
Based on our previous conclusions, in specifications (4)-(6) we classify the acquisitions in
diversifying and focusing without first controlling for geography. We define the dummy Div
equal to 1 if acquisitions are diversifying and equal to 0 if focusing, and the dummy Geo div
equal to 1 for “in-state” buyer (diversifying) and 0 otherwise (focusing). Specification (4)
is analogous to (3) but without explicitly controlling for geography; while specification (5)
separately controls for geography. The interaction of the diversification dummy and ∆MAES
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in specification (4) is positive and significant at 1% level, indicating that diversifying acqui-
sitions that are associated with an increase in bidders’ systemic risk have an overall positive
impact on acquisition’s value. The magnitude of the overall impact on CAR for acquisi-
tions that engage in systemic risk-shifting is about 1.104ppt (−1.069 + 2.173), which is also
economically significant (since the level is not significant this value is statistically higher,
2.173ppt). Because the diversification dummy is arguably capturing both activity and geog-
raphy, in specification (5) we separately control for geography to further investigate whether
activity and/or geography matter for systemic risk-shifting. We find that the interaction
term between the geography dummy and ∆MAES is not significant, which is not surprising
given that Div is capturing both activity and geography diversification.
Next, we address whether only diversifying acquisitions create value through systemic
risk-shifting or whether this is also the case for focusing acquisitions. From specification
(3), we find that the interaction terms for GFAD and GDAF with ∆MAES are negative
and significant, suggesting that focusing acquisitions with some dimension of diversification
create value. However, if we look at purely focusing acquisitions, which are the baselines for
specifications (3) (GFAF) and (4) (Foc = 1-Div), we find that only diversifying acquisitions
create value through systemic risk-shifting.19
Finally, in specification (6) we explore our third research question by testing whether the
value of systemic risk-shifting through acquisition has increased after the recent financial
crisis. The difference between pre- and post-crisis periods is reflected in the coefficient of the
triple interaction term Div∗∆MAES∗post-crisis, where post − crisis is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for periods after 2009 (i.e., 2010-2015) and 0 otherwise. This coefficient is positive
19An interesting observation is that on the one hand, in specification (3) of Table 1.23, GDAF group has
the highest coefficient of interaction with ∆MAES among others. On the other hand, in specification (4)
of Table 1.16, we observe a premium for “Securities & Investments” deals. These observations may imply
that our results are driven by Securities & Investment firms that acquire other firms with similar activity,
but in a different geographical region. We checked the deal type within the sample of 199 acquisitions with
publicly-traded targets and found only 1 such a deal. The results are robust to excluding that one deal.
Therefore, we rule out the possibility that our results are driven by such cases.
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and statistically significant at the 10% level. Although the result is not statistically strong,
it provides some evidence that the value of systemic risk-shifting through acquisition has
increased since the recent financial crisis.
1.5.5 Systemic risk-shifting in diversifying acquisitions
In this section, we focus on our fifth hypothesis (H5) and move away from value creation. As
explained in the introduction, prior literature has found that managerial benefits can be an
incentive for diversifying acquisitions and those benefits are more applicable to bidders with
poor pre-merger performance. In the previous section, we found that systemic risk-shifting
is another incentive for diversifying acquisitions. Motivated by these two observations, in
this section we investigate the relationship between acquisition diversification and systemic
risk-shifting, as a function of bidder’s pre-merger performance.
We estimate the following model:
∆MAESi = γ0 + γ1Div × (Bidder pre−merger performance)i
+ γ2(Bidder characteristics)i + γ3(Target characteristics)i + εi (1.8)
where i indexes acquisitions. The main coefficient of interest corresponds to the interaction
term between the Div dummy and bidder pre-merger performance.
We expect to see a positive coefficient. Our prior is that among diversifying acquisi-
tions, those with higher bidder pre-merger performance are associated with higher levels of
systemic risk-shifting. This is founded on the idea that poorly performing bidders engage
in diversifying acquisitions for managerial benefits while well-performing bidders engage in
diversifying acquisition for systemic risk-shifting motive.
The model is estimated using both OLS and quantile regression at the 75th percentile.
Quantile regression is used to focus on acquisitions that lead to more systemic risk-shifting
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(i.e., higher values of ∆MAES). The results are presented in Table 1.24. As expected, in
specifications (3) and (6), the coefficient of the interaction term between the Div dummy and
bidder pre-merger performance is positive and significant at a 5% and 1% level respectively.
This result suggests that systemic risk-shifting is higher as a function of bidder’s pre-merger
performance for diversifying versus focusing acquisitions (in line with our prior). Further-
more, this means that diversifying acquisitions with relatively well-performing bidders are
associated with higher systemic risk-shifting.
Our analysis also supports the following conclusions. First, bidders with higher non-
interest income seem to engage more in systemic risk-shifting via acquisitions (significant
at a 1% level). This is consistent with the literature, which finds that higher non-interest
income (i.e., non-core activities like investment banking and trading) is associated with
a higher contribution to systemic risk relative to traditional banking (i.e., deposit taking
and lending) (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia, 2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010;
Dittmar and Thakor, 2007). Second, both analyses show an inverse relationship between
target’s pre-merger performance and systemic risk-shifting (significant at a 10% and 1%
level respectively). This could be attributed to other oppertunities for value creation in
acquisitions with under-performing targets (e.g., bidders can create value by improving the
management and efficiency of the target).
Next, we perform a similar analysis using a logistic regression to explore likelihood in
addition to degree of systemic risk-shifting. We define a dummy variable Increase 75 equal
to 1 if ∆MAES is above the 75th percentile and 0 otherwise. As in the quantile regression
analysis, the reason for choosing the 75th percentile is to focus on acquisitions that lead to
more systemic risk-shifting (i.e. higher values of ∆MAES). We estimate the following model:






= λ0 + λ1Div × (Bidder pre−merger performance)i
+ λ2(Bidder characteristics)i + λ3(Target characteristics)i + εi
(1.9)
where i indexes acquisitions.
The results are presented in Table 1.25. Specification (4) supports our finding from
quantile regression, although the result is weaker (significant at a 10% level). In addition,
specification (4) also supports the finding that bidders with higher non-interest income are
more likely to increase bidders’ contribution to systemic risk as the result of acquisition (odd
ratio > 1 and significant at a 10% level).
1.6 Robustness checks
As stated earlier, target pre-acquisition performance is available for only a subset of our
sample, so in order to determine “distressed” acquisitions based on targets’ pre-merger per-
formance, we imputed the median for the missing values. In this section, we perform two
robustness tests to gain comfort in our proposed solution to address this data limitation.
First, in specifications (1)-(4) of Table 1.26 we perform the same analysis as in Table 1.17
without accounting for poor-performing targets (i.e., we do not use the dummy “low” in our
analysis). Our conclusions are robust to excluding the dummy “low” and its interaction with
∆MAES. Namely, the market reacts significantly positive to an increase in systemic risk
contribution (H1), unless the acquisition is announced during a crisis period (H2). Second, we
run the same specification as in Table 1.17 model (2) but limiting the sample to acquisitions
that have a non-missing value for target’s pre-merger performance. The results are pre-
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sented in specification (5) of Table 1.26. As anticipated, the sample size drops significantly
to 172 observations because the target pre-merger performance measure is available only for
publicly-traded targets. The main results are still robust and significant at 10% level. The
lower level of signficance can be due to the smaller sample size or the characteristics of this
restricted subsample.
Next, rather than controlling for targets’ pre-merger performance by using a dummy
variable, we restrict the sample to those acquisitions with “good” targets (i.e., where tar-
get’s pre-acquisition performance is above the 25th percentile). This allows us to study the
relationship of changes in systemic risk and CAR in crisis versus non-crisis periods in a
relatively large sample while avoiding imputing values for missing pre-merger performance.
Furthermore, by restricting to relatively well performing targets we are also able to focus
exclusively on economic conditions as the source of distress. Results are presented in Ta-
ble 1.27. For comparison purposes, the first specification also includes private targets for
which pre-merger performance measure is not available and hence imputed at the median.
The results are robust in all specifications, indicating that an increase in bidders’ systemic
risk contribution is associated with a favorable market reaction resulting in an increase in
bidders’ market value.
Another potentially influential choice in our analysis is the threshold for targets’ pre-
merger performance to identify “distressed” acquisitions (i.e., 25th percentile). In this section
we test if our results are robust to alternative thresholds. We consider 10th and 50th per-
centiles as alternative thresholds and specify “low” and “distress” dummy variables based on
those alternative choices. Table 1.28 presents our analysis using the 10th percentile threshold.
Our main results are still robust; however, the interaction term between changes in systemic
risk and the dummy variable “low” is now significant for all the specifications ((1),(2), and
(4) at 10% and (3) at 5% level). This is not surprising since by reducing the threshold from
the 25th to the 10th percentile we are focusing on targets with really poor performance in
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relative terms. Results for the 50th percentile are given in the appendix in Table 1.29 and
are also robust.
Next, we investigate the choice of the crisis periods. As mentioned earlier, the crisis
periods in our analysis correspond to those identified by the NBER plus the year 2011 to
account for spillover effects of European sovereign debt crisis into the U.S. financial sector.
Since 2011 is not a crisis specific to US and our analysis is focused on acquisitions of US
institutions, we check if our results are robust to excluding 2011 from the crisis periods. The
results are presented in Table 1.30. Notice that the sample size remains the same since this
change only affects the definition of the “crisis” dummy. Table 1.30 suggests that our results
are robust to the exclusion of 2011 as a crisis period.
As mentioned in Section 1.4, there are 573 unique acquirers in our sample. 427 of these
acquirers appear only once while there are more acquistions associated with the rest. To
ensure those repeat acquirers are not impacting our results, we perform the main analysis ex-
cluding repeat acquirers. As observed in Table 1.31, the main results are robust to excluding
those observations.
We next assess the robustness of our results in Section 1.5.4 and 1.5.5 by weighing against
alternative measures of activity and geography diversification. We use a second method to
measure activity (and geography) relatedness of merging partners based on the correlation
coefficient of their stock returns. As with the “Div” measure, because this measure is also
built upon stock returns correlations it will capture some geography relatedness as well.
Following Morck et al. (1990), we examine the correlation coefficients of monthly stock
returns of the partners over three years prior to the acquisition announcement, and require
at least 24 non-missing monthly returns for this calculation. We take the 50th percentile of
the correlation coefficients as the cutoff for classifying acquisitions into focusing (above the
50th percentile) and diversifying (at or below the 50th percentile).
Table 1.32 presents the robustness results for Section 1.5.4. Specifications (1)-(2) are
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analogous to (4)-(5) in Table 1.23, but use instead the correlation measure for diversification.
Specification (3) is also analogous to specification (5) but, in addition to the correlation
measure, it uses a different geography diversification measure based on market overlap.
Market overlap is a categorical variable equal to 0 for “In market”, 1 for “Partial overlap” and
2 for “Market expansion.” Overall, we find that our results are consistent with Table 1.23.
Particularly, diversifying acquisitions that are associated with an increase in MAES have a
positive impact on acquirers’ shareholders wealth (significant at a 5% level in specifications
(1) and (3), and at a 1% level in specification (2), where we separately control for geography
diversification).
Finally, specifications (4)-(5) only have measures of geography diversification to further
test whether value creation is driven by geography as opposed to activity focus or diversifi-
cation. The results highlight that geography diversification on its own, measured based on
market overlap does not lead to creating value through systemic risk-shifting. In contrast,
when measured as “in or out of state buyer” the opposite conclusion holds (significant at a
5% level). The latter result, in conjunction with the conclusions from specification (2) sug-
gest that geography diversification may play a role in systemic risk-shifting. Based on these
results, in specification (6) we only include a measure of activity diversification by adding
the dummies “GFAD + GDAD” (activity diversifying) and “GFAF + GDAF” (activity fo-
cusing). The interaction term with ∆MAES is signifcant at a 10% level, which means the
results are consistent with Table 1.23 although weaker than when using the “Div” measure.
This is not surprising because “Div” is a more flexible measure that does not impose a
prior classification by geography before grouping acquisitions into activity diversifying and
focusing and may be partially capturing the role of geography diversification in systemic
risk-shifting.
Table 1.33 presents the robustness results for Section 1.5.5. Our findings are generally
robust for “Bidder non-interest income,” which is significant at a 1% level in specifications
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(3) and (6); and “Target pre-merger performance,” which is significant at a 10% and 1% level
in specifications (3) and (6) respectively. The relation between the alternative diversification
measure and ∆MAES is not statistically significant. As evidenced by Table 1.32, the results
are weaker with this alternative diversification measure. This is not too surprising since
the correlation between “Div” and “Correlation 50” is relatively low (0.15 approx.). This
may suggest that “Correlation 50” is too simplistic and may not capture well diversifying
patterns.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore whether acquirers shareholders gain from acquisitions through
systemic risk-shifting. We find that in general, acquisitions coincide with an increase in
systemic risk20 of acquirers (relative to their non-merging counterparts) while their non-
systemic risk does not statistically change. We also find that the market (ex-ante) reacts
positively to an increase in acquirers’ market-adjusted systemic risk leading to a value gain
for acquirers. This result suggests that risk-shifting, particularly in the systemic dimension,
is a source of value creation for acquirers. In other words, acquirers take private benefit at
public cost. This finding does not generally apply to distressed acquisitions.
Interestingly, we find that the market reacts negatively to an increase in acquirers’ market
adjusted systemic risk when acquisition is announced during crisis periods. This is congruent
with the notion of availability in behavioral finance that the easier it is for us to recall
instances in which something has happened, the more likely we will assume it is. During
crisis periods, realization of tail risk can lead to investors’ higher risk aversion and unfavorable
reaction to systemic risk-taking.
Prior literature have identified two channels through which bank consolidation may lead
20However, we do not observe an increase in systemic risk contribution for the acquisitions announced
during crisis periods.
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to overall fragility of financial system. First, consolidation can lead to forming larger and
more diversified institutions, which can change the financial network architecture and con-
sequently increase the likelihood of systemic failures. In particular, an increase in similarity
of the institutions and density of their interconnections makes it more likely for the shocks
to be transmitted across the system. Second, according to empirical findings, consolidation
seems to increase the incentives of individual financial firms to take on more risk, such that
it appears to outweigh the potential risk-reduction achievable through diversification.
We argue that if acquisitions contribute to instability of financial system due to forming
more diversified institutions, we should see more negative impact from diversifying acqui-
sitions relative to focusing ones. Our results suggest that only diversifying (as opposed to
focusing) acquisitions create value by engaging in systemic risk-shifting. We find this is
particularly the case when the acquisition is not driven by managerial incentives (i.e., when
bidder pre-merger performance is relatively poor). Systemic risk-shifting is, however, not
limited to a specific dimension of diversification. Indeed, it can be achieved through either
activity or geography expansion.
Furthermore, since systemic risk-shifting is driven by implicit or explicit government
guarantees in “too-big-to-fail” or “too-many-to-fail” cases, we study whether the extensive
bailouts in recent financial crisis have increased the market value of such guarantees for
financial institutions. We find empirical evidence that supports this notion.
Overall, our findings imply that there are circumstances in which acquirers’ shareholders
gain private benefit at the expense of the economy. Our findings suggest the existence of a
new source of value gain in bank acquisitions, namely systemic risk-shifting, which due to
its systemic nature could have important implications for financial stability and may call for
higher regulatory attention in certain types of M&A activity.
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Table 1.4: Definitions of variables used in the empirical study.
Variable Definition
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of an acquirer is computed over [-10,+1] rel-
ative to the acquisition announcement. The coefficients of the market model are
estimated using daily returns over 300 to 51 trading days before the acquisition an-
nouncement.
Crisis Is a dummy variable equal to 1 for acquisitions announced during the years 1990,
2001, 2007-2008, and 2011, and 0 otherwise.
Geo div Is a categorical variable for geographic diversification, which is set to 0 for “In market”,
1 for “Partial overlap” and 2 for “Market expansion.”
Increase Is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ∆MAES is positive and 0 otherwise.
Low Is a dummy variable equal to 1 if target’s pre-merger performance is below 25th
percentile and 0 otherwise.
Distress Is a dummy variable equal to 1 if acquisition is announced in a crisis period or target’s
pre-merger performance is below 25th percentile and 0 otherwise.
MES Is the average return on an individual bank’s stock on the days the bank sector index
experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
∆MAES MAES is the Market Adjusted Expected Shortfall defined as the difference between
the acquirer’s MES and the financial sector’s ES. ∆MAES is the difference between
post- and pre-merger MAES, where the pre-merger period is defined as the interval
[-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and the post-merger period is the
interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.
∆NSR Individual Risk (NSR), as defined in Amihud et al. (2002), is the variance of daily
stock returns of acquiring bank relative to that of a financial sector index. ∆NSR
is the difference between post- and pre-merger NSR, where the pre-merger period is
defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and the
post-merger period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.
Relative size Ratio of deal value to market value of the acquirer’s equity 10 days before the deal
announcement.
Bidder/Target characteristics
Assets Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at fiscal year end prior to the acquisition.
Non-interest income Banks’ (long term) non-interest income standardized by their average assets.
Pre-merger performance Return of a target (bidder) 300 to 51 days before the acquisition announcement minus
the return on the financial sector index for the same period.
Market-to-book Market value of common equity 10 days before announcement divided by book value
of common equity.
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Variable Definition
Diversification Variables
Div Is a dummy variable equal to 1 for “Diversifying” acquisitions and 0 for “focusing”, without
controlling first for geography.
Activity Div Is a dummy variable equal to 1 for “Diversifying” acquisitions and 0 for “focusing”, when controlling
first for geography.
Geo div Is a dummy variable equal to 1 for “Not In-state” buyer and 0 otherwise.
Market overlap Is a categorical variable for geography diversification, which is set to 0 for “In market”, 1 for
“Partial overlap” and 2 for “Market expansion.”
GDAD Geography Diversifying and Activity Diversifying
GDAF Geography Diversifying and Activity Focusing
GFAF Geography Focusing and Activity Focusing
GFAD Geography Focusing and Activity Diversifying
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of an acquirer is computed over [-10,+1] relative to the
acquisition announcement. The betas and alphas (of market model) are estimated using daily
returns from 300 to 51 trading days before the acquisition announcement.
Crisis Is a dummy variable equal to 1 for acquisitions announced during the years 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011, and 0 otherwise.
MES Is the average return on an individual bank’s stock on the days the bank sector index experienced
its 5% worst outcomes.
∆MAES MAES is the Market Adjusted Expected Shortfall defined as the difference between the acquirer’s
MES and the financial sector’s ES. ∆MAES is the difference between post- and pre-merger MAES,
where the pre-merger period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition an-
nouncement, and the post-merger period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition
completion.
Relative size Ratio of deal value to market value of the acquirer’s equity 10 days before the deal announcement.
Bidder/Target characteristics
Assets Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at fiscal year end prior to the acquisition.
Non-interest income Banks’ (long term) non-interest income standardized by their average assets.
Pre-merger performance Return of a target (bidder) 300 to 51 days before the acquisition announcement minus the return
on the financial sector index for the same period.
Market-to-book Market value of common equity 10 days before announcement divided by book value of equity.
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Table 1.5: Change in market adjusted systemic risk.
This table presents pre- and post- acquisition levels as well as changes in the acquirer’s Market Adjusted
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MAES). We use MES as a measure of systemic risk contribution calculated
based on the average return of a bank during the 5% worst days of a financial sector index. MAES
is defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial











pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and
the post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. Means
and p-values are presented for the full sample, and for the non-crisis and crisis subsamples. The crisis
years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 780 -0.308 0.000 -0.273 0.000 0.035 0.553
Non-Crisis Periods 645 -0.341 0.000 -0.228 0.000 0.114 0.036
Crisis Periods 135 -0.148 0.296 -0.488 0.067 -0.341 0.128
Table 1.6: Change in bidders’ non-systemic relative risk.
This table presents pre- and post- acquisition levels as well as changes in the acquirer’s Non-Systemic
Relative Risk (NSR). NSRi = V ar(Ri)/V ar(Index), where Ri is the daily return of acquirer i and
Index is a financial market index. We calculate the change in NSR for acquirer i as ∆NSRi =
NSRi,[+11,+180] − NSRi,[−180,−11]. Pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative
to the acquisition announcement, and post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the
acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
pre-merger NSR post-merger NSR ∆NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 780 5.198 0.000 5.171 0.000 -0.027 0.937
Non-Crisis Periods 645 5.491 0.000 5.510 0.000 0.020 0.961
Crisis Periods 135 3.799 0.000 3.550 0.000 -0.249 0.565
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Table 1.7: Change in bidders’ risk for non-distressed vs. distressed acquisitions.
Panel A: Systemic risk
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Acquisitions 780 -0.308 0.000 -0.273 0.000 0.035 0.553
Non-distressed 606 -0.310 0.000 -0.182 0.001 0.128 0.023
Distressed 174 -0.299 0.016 -0.587 0.006 -0.288 0.109
Panel B: Non-systemic risk
pre-merger NSR post-merger NSR ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Acquisitions 780 5.198 0.000 5.171 0.000 -0.027 0.937
Non-distressed 606 5.529 0.000 5.569 0.000 0.040 0.923
Distressed 174 4.043 0.000 3.783 0.000 -0.260 0.554
Table 1.8: Change in bidders’ risk by tertile of deal value.
Panel A: Non-distressed acquisitions
∆ MAES ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value
Low deal value 202 0.050 0.622 -0.873 0.304
Medium deal value 202 0.206 0.020 0.269 0.506
High deal value 202 0.128 0.214 0.724 0.377
Panel B: Distressed acquisitions
∆ MAES ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value
Low deal value 58 -0.511 0.213 1.210 0.239
Medium deal value 58 -0.437 0.094 -1.348 0.074
High deal value 58 0.084 0.724 -0.641 0.044
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Table 1.9: Change in bidders’ risk by tertile of bidders’ total assets.
Panel A: Non-distressed acquisitions
∆ MAES ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value
Low total assets 187 0.116 0.270 -1.172 0.087
Medium total assets 186 0.225 0.012 -0.470 0.151
High total assets 186 0.112 0.270 1.064 0.228
Panel B: Distressed acquisitions
∆ MAES ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value
Low total assets 55 -1.252 0.004 -0.091 0.937
Medium total assets 55 -0.124 0.601 -0.704 0.329
High total assets 54 0.491 0.043 -0.391 0.109
Table 1.10: Change in bidders’ risk by tertile of bidders’ performance.
Panel A: Non-distressed acquisitions
∆ MAES ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value
Low bidder performance 202 -0.041 0.637 -1.321 0.012
Medium bidder performance 202 0.082 0.381 0.563 0.462
High bidder performance 202 0.343 0.002 0.878 0.290
Panel B: Distressed acquisitions
∆ MAES ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value
Low bidder performance 58 -0.055 0.875 0.823 0.333
Medium bidder performance 58 -0.696 0.019 -0.569 0.516
High bidder performance 58 -0.112 0.696 -1.033 0.041
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Table 1.11: Change in market adjusted systemic risk of acquirers and targets combined.
This table presents pre-acquisition Market Adjusted Marginal Expected Shortfall (MAES) of acquir-
ers and targets combined versus post-acquisition MAES of combined entity and the change in MAES
as the result of a acquisition. We use MES as a measure of systemic risk contribution calculated
based on the average return of a bank during the 5% worst days of a financial sector index. MAES is
defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sec-











pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement,
and the post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.
Means and p-values are presented for the full sample, and for the non-crisis and crisis subsamples.
The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
Panel A: Systemic risk of acquirers and targets combined
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 199 -0.348 0.000 -0.387 0.000 -0.039 0.660
Non-Crisis Periods 167 -0.382 0.000 -0.354 0.000 0.028 0.761
Crisis Periods 32 -0.170 0.533 -0.562 0.069 -0.393 0.158
Panel B: Systemic risk of acquirers for the limited sample
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 199 -0.311 0.001 -0.387 0.000 -0.077 0.384
Non-Crisis Periods 167 -0.345 0.000 -0.354 0.000 -0.009 0.923
Crisis Periods 32 -0.131 0.637 -0.562 0.069 -0.431 0.136
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Table 1.12: Change in combined entity’s systemic risk for non-distressed vs. distressed
acquisitions.
Panel A: Acquisitions during 1986-2015
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Acquisitions 199 -0.348 0.000 -0.387 0.000 -0.039 0.660
Non-distressed 128 -0.259 0.005 -0.178 0.056 0.080 0.423
Distressed 71 -0.509 0.007 -0.764 0.000 -0.255 0.145
Panel B: Acquisitions during 1991-2009
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Acquisitions 147 -0.565 0.000 -0.515 0.000 0.050 0.603
Non-distressed 91 -0.426 0.000 -0.241 0.026 0.185 0.104
Distressed 56 -0.790 0.000 -0.960 0.000 -0.169 0.325
Panel C: Acquisitions during 1991-2009 excluding repeat acquirers
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Acquisitions 127 -0.660 0.000 -0.598 0.000 0.061 0.537
Non-distressed 79 -0.487 0.000 -0.310 0.007 0.176 0.162
Distressed 48 -0.944 0.000 -1.073 0.000 -0.128 0.424
Panel D: Acquisitions during 1991-2009 excluding repeat acquirers- MES is not market-
adjusted
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Acquisitions 127 1.133 0.000 1.450 0.000 0.318 0.023
Non-distressed 79 1.092 0.000 1.166 0.000 0.074 0.562
Distressed 48 1.199 0.000 1.919 0.000 0.719 0.019
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Table 1.13: Change in market adjusted systemic risk of acquisitions with public targets vs. those with
non-public targets.
This table presents pre- and post- acquisition levels as well as changes in the acquirer’s Market Adjusted
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MAES). We use MES as a measure of systemic risk contribution calculated
based on the average return of a bank during the 5% worst days of a financial sector index. MAES
is defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial











pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and
the post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. Means
and p-values are presented for the full sample, and for the non-crisis and crisis subsamples. The crisis
years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
Panel A: Acquisitions with public targets
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 199 -0.311 0.001 -0.387 0.000 -0.077 0.384
Non-Crisis Periods 167 -0.345 0.000 -0.354 0.000 -0.009 0.923
Crisis Periods 32 -0.131 0.637 -0.562 0.069 -0.431 0.136
Panel B: Acquisitions with non-public targets
pre-merger MAES post-merger MAES ∆ MAES
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 581 -0.307 0.000 -0.233 0.004 0.073 0.320
Non-Crisis Periods 478 -0.340 0.000 -0.183 0.007 0.157 0.018
Crisis Periods 103 -0.153 0.355 -0.465 0.167 -0.312 0.265
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Table 1.14: Change in bidders’ non-systemic relative risk of acquisitions with public targets vs. those
with non-public targets.
This table presents pre- and post- acquisition levels as well as changes in the acquirer’s Non-Systemic
Relative Risk (NSR). NSRi = V ar(Ri)/V ar(Index), where Ri is the daily return of acquirer i and
Index is a financial market index. We calculate the change in NSR for acquirer i as ∆NSRi =
NSRi,[+11,+180] − NSRi,[−180,−11]. Pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative
to the acquisition announcement, and post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the
acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
Panel A: Acquisitions with public targets
pre-merger NSR post-merger NSR ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 199 4.414 0.000 4.552 0.000 0.138 0.755
Non-Crisis Periods 167 4.716 0.000 5.019 0.000 0.304 0.557
Crisis Periods 32 2.843 0.000 2.116 0.000 -0.727 0.164
Panel B: Acquisitions with non-public targets
pre-merger NSR post-merger NSR ∆ NSR
Obs Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value
All Periods 581 5.466 0.000 5.383 0.000 -0.083 0.845
Non-Crisis Periods 478 5.761 0.000 5.682 0.000 -0.080 0.875
Crisis Periods 103 4.096 0.000 3.996 0.000 -0.100 0.853
Table 1.15: Market reaction to bank acquisitions.
This table presents the market reaction to acquisition announcement estimated as the CAR (Cumulative
Abnormal Return) computed from 10 days before the acquisition announcement to 1 day following the
announcement. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008 and 2011.
All Mergers Poor Target Perf. Good Target Perf.
Obs Mean P-value Obs Mean P-value Obs Mean P-value
All Periods 780 -0.411 0.064 50 -3.954 0.000 730 -0.168 0.456
Non-Crisis Periods 645 -0.532 0.022 39 -4.146 0.000 606 -0.299 0.204
Crisis Periods 135 0.165 0.799 11 -3.271 0.193 124 0.469 0.484
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Table 1.16: Market reaction to changes in systemic risk.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. “Distress” is 1 if acquisition is announced in a crisis period or target’s pre-acquisition performance is
below the 25th percentile and 0 otherwise. MAES is defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer
and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval
[-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180]
relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distress -0.562 -1.124∗ -1.431∗∗ -1.303∗∗
(0.372) (0.084) (0.035) (0.044)
∆MAES 0.406∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007) (0.046) (0.008)
Distress*∆MAES -0.584∗ -0.672∗∗ -0.660∗∗ -0.719∗∗
(0.063) (0.039) (0.027) (0.023)
∆NSR -0.0137 -0.0271 -0.00552 -0.0294
(0.423) (0.258) (0.819) (0.207)
Relative size -3.512 -5.189 -2.828 -4.590
(0.379) (0.403) (0.742) (0.439)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0352∗∗∗ -0.0383∗∗∗ -0.0358∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001)
Geo diversification -0.321 -0.700∗∗ -0.383
(0.215) (0.015) (0.144)
Bidder assets 0.0254 0.206 -0.105
(0.867) (0.320) (0.486)
Bidder market-to-book 0.109 -0.297 -0.114
(0.346) (0.443) (0.403)




Specialty Finance deal 1.977∗
(0.056)
Financial Technology deal 2.115
(0.238)




Constant -0.403∗ -0.663 4.730 1.169
(0.082) (0.767) (0.216) (0.597)
Observations 780 645 490 639
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.027 0.048 0.054
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.17: Market reaction to changes in systemic risk by source of distress.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with pre-acquisition perfromance below the 25th percentile. MAES is defined
as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index.
Pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and
post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are
1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.792 0.261 0.00761 -0.101
(0.261) (0.717) (0.992) (0.888)
Low -4.224∗∗∗ -4.445∗∗∗ -3.624∗∗∗ -3.956∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆MAES 0.446∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.024) (0.005)
Crisis*∆MAES -0.608∗ -0.632∗ -0.608∗∗ -0.684∗∗
(0.059) (0.054) (0.045) (0.033)
Low*∆MAES -0.695 -1.372 -1.265 -1.334
(0.386) (0.207) (0.239) (0.219)
∆NSR -0.0148 -0.0293 -0.00838 -0.0310
(0.377) (0.226) (0.729) (0.188)
Relative size -3.332 -3.462 -1.600 -3.255
(0.354) (0.541) (0.843) (0.561)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0398∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Geo diversification -0.328 -0.661∗∗ -0.384
(0.199) (0.019) (0.138)
Bidder assets -0.0437 0.126 -0.144
(0.769) (0.537) (0.338)
Bidder market-to-book 0.0747 -0.242 -0.116
(0.507) (0.522) (0.400)




Specialty Finance deal 1.692
(0.112)
Financial Technology deal 1.834
(0.314)




Constant -0.423∗ 0.352 5.100 1.747
(0.067) (0.873) (0.173) (0.425)
Observations 780 645 490 639
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.054 0.070 0.072
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.18: Market reaction to changes in systemic risk in crisis periods.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986
and 2015. Low refers to targets with pre-acquisition perfromance below the 25th percentile. MAES is
defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector
index. Pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement,
and post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The sample is
limited to acquisitions announced in a crisis, i.e., years 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆MAES -0.1000 -0.0996 -0.0898 -0.216
(0.717) (0.718) (0.718) (0.421)
Low -4.086∗ -4.084∗ -2.886 -2.939
(0.098) (0.098) (0.262) (0.232)
Relative size 0.00120 -229.6∗∗∗ 0.0285
(1.000) (0.003) (0.995)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0519 -0.0519 -0.0464 -0.0548
(0.133) (0.133) (0.272) (0.117)
Bidder assets -0.493 -0.499 -0.0869 -0.612
(0.342) (0.335) (0.861) (0.260)
Bidder market-to-book -0.0960 -0.0982 -0.204 -0.459
(0.739) (0.732) (0.874) (0.196)
Deal value 0.0129
(0.937)




Specialty Finance deal 6.716
(0.206)
Financial Technology deal -2.364
(0.636)




Constant 7.550 7.637 -2.567 8.602
(0.346) (0.339) (0.845) (0.279)
Observations 127 127 83 127
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.018 0.284 0.066
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.19: Market reaction to changes in systemic risk of acquisitions announced in 2001.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986
and 2015. Low refers to targets with pre-acquisition perfromance below the 25th percentile. MAES is
defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector
index. Pre-acquisition period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement,
and post-acquisition period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The sample is
limited to acquisitions announced in 2001.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆MAES -3.168∗∗ -3.168∗∗ -1.918∗∗ -2.873∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014)
Low -3.212 -3.219 -2.961 -2.114
(0.225) (0.223) (0.353) (0.460)
Relative size 7.922∗ -1160.5∗ 4.581
(0.082) (0.065) (0.188)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0458 -0.0458 -0.0102 -0.0326
(0.260) (0.259) (0.831) (0.491)
Bidder assets -1.544∗ -1.537∗ 0.0658 -1.640∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.960) (0.065)
Bidder market-to-book -0.784∗ -0.783∗ 0.183 -0.807
(0.068) (0.068) (0.950) (0.211)
Deal value 0.412∗
(0.080)




Specialty Finance deal 7.438
(0.536)




Constant 24.33∗ 24.25∗ -24.05 24.85∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.318) (0.061)
Observations 46 46 36 46
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.283 0.555 0.291
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.20: Robustness to controling for TBTF motive.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. TBTF 1 is equal to 1 if the acquirer moves up to the top quartile of total assests after the deal
completion and 0 otherwise. TBTF 2 is equal to 1 if the acquirer’s total assets after acquisition is more
than $100 billion and 0 otherwise. “Distress” is 1 if acquisition is announced in a crisis period or target’s
pre-merger performance is below the 25th percentile and 0 otherwise. MAES is defined as the difference
between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-acquisition period
is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-acquisition period is
the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011.
(1) (2) (3)
Distress -1.558∗∗ -1.542∗∗ -1.581∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016)
∆MAES 0.528∗∗ 0.509∗∗ 0.462∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.032)




∆Size ∗ ∆MAES -0.000110
(0.409)
Geo Diversification -0.707∗∗ -0.728∗∗ -0.666∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.020)
∆NSR -0.0208 -0.0274 -0.0216
(0.640) (0.533) (0.628)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0428∗∗∗ -0.0416∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Bidder assets 0.161 0.126 0.212
(0.481) (0.546) (0.319)
Bidder market-to-book -0.0524 0.0110 0.0374
(0.887) (0.977) (0.917)
Bidder non-interest income -0.366 -0.231 -0.365
(0.182) (0.379) (0.186)
Target assets -0.819∗∗∗ -0.455∗ -0.749∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.071) (0.001)








TBTF 2* ∆MAES -1.026
(0.225)
Constant 8.031∗∗ 4.099 6.341∗
(0.035) (0.276) (0.074)
Observations 471 471 478
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.073 0.082
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.21: Acquisition value (CAR) by activity and geography diversification.
This table presents the market reaction to acquisition announcement estimated as the CAR
(Cumulative Abnormal Return) computed from 10 days before the acquisition announcement
to 1 day following the announcement. Acquisitions are grouped by both geography and
activity diversification.
N mean p-value sd min max
All acquisitions 193 -2.135 0.000 5.77 -21.16 12.63
Geography & activity focus 25 -1.923 0.140 6.30 -12.38 11.31
Geography focus & activity div. 102 -1.774 0.002 5.56 -21.16 12.63
Geography div. & activity focus 8 -2.048 0.292 5.08 -11.90 3.07
Geography & activity div. 58 -2.872 0.001 6.06 -20.68 11.43
Figure 1.3: Distribution of CAR for diversifying versus focusing acquisitions.
Table 1.22: Acquisition value (CAR) by diversification without controlling for geog-
raphy.
This table presents the market reaction to acquisition announcement estimated as the CAR
(Cumulative Abnormal Return) computed from 10 days before the acquisition announcement
to 1 day following the announcement. Acquisitions are grouped by diversification without
controlling for geography.
N mean p-value sd min max
All acquisitions 193 -2.135 0.000 5.77 -21.16 12.63
Focusing 59 -1.676 0.029 5.75 -12.70 11.31
Diversifying 134 -2.337 0.000 5.79 -21.16 12.63
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 64
Table 1.23: Value of diversifying acquisitions.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986
and 2015. MAES is defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of
a financial sector index. Pre-merger period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition
announcement, and post-merger period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.
The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008, and 2011. Post-crisis refers to 2010-2015. In specifications (1)-
(4): GFAF (Geography and activity focus), GFAD (Geography focus and activity diversification), GDAF
(Geography diversification and activity focus) and GDAD (Geography and activity diversification). In
specifications (5)-(7): “Div” is a dummy variable for diversification without controlling for geography, and
“Geo div” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for “Not In-state” buyer and 0 otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆MAES 0.482 -1.116∗ -1.036 -1.299∗ -1.063
(0.333) (0.091) (0.109) (0.052) (0.150)
Crisis*∆MAES -1.452 -1.313 -1.649∗∗ -1.415
(0.113) (0.165) (0.026) (0.101)
Crisis -0.865 -1.010 -0.859 -0.901
(0.545) (0.502) (0.539) (0.531)
GFAD -0.642 -0.522 -0.642
(0.655) (0.722) (0.651)
GDAF -0.466 -0.550 -1.171
(0.873) (0.848) (0.693)








Div -1.069 -0.919 -0.533
(0.238) (0.327) (0.582)














Relative size -15.49 -15.86 -17.78∗ -15.89∗ -17.15∗ -15.20
(0.104) (0.100) (0.072) (0.090) (0.077) (0.102)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0590∗ -0.0614∗ -0.0644∗∗ -0.0685∗∗ -0.0704∗∗ -0.0682∗∗
(0.074) (0.055) (0.039) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027)
Bidder assets 0.175 0.167 0.214 0.157 0.253 0.151
(0.601) (0.622) (0.533) (0.627) (0.462) (0.652)
Bidder market-to-book 0.162 0.0931 0.137 0.0164 -0.00843 -0.0105
(0.794) (0.882) (0.825) (0.979) (0.989) (0.987)
Bidder non-interest income 0.0348 -0.0110 0.182 -0.00899 0.0974 0.00333
(0.822) (0.951) (0.245) (0.962) (0.616) (0.982)
Target pre-merger performance 0.0392∗ 0.0398∗ 0.0452∗∗ 0.0443∗∗ 0.0455∗∗ 0.0471∗∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.043) (0.046) (0.035) (0.024)
Constant -4.126 -3.949 -4.654 -3.555 -4.968 -3.681
(0.412) (0.441) (0.361) (0.468) (0.332) (0.458)
Other controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.033 0.056 0.083 0.085 0.069
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.24: Analysis of ∆MAES - OLS & Quantile regressions
The dependent variable is ∆MAES. The quantile regressions are at the 75th percentile. The analysis uses
acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and 2015. MAES is defined as the difference between
MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger period is defined
as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period is the interval
[+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. “Div” is a dummy variable for diversification.
OLS Regression Quintile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div -0.323 -0.373∗ -0.110 -0.193 -0.241 0.223
(0.115) (0.087) (0.654) (0.332) (0.332) (0.353)
Div * Bidder pre-merger performance 0.0279∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.004)
Bidder pre-merger performance 0.00252 0.00712 -0.0124 -0.00291 0.00180 -0.0186∗∗
(0.696) (0.376) (0.244) (0.632) (0.809) (0.043)
Relative size -0.463 -0.857 -1.053 -2.499 -1.719 -2.573
(0.538) (0.329) (0.242) (0.207) (0.503) (0.194)
Bidder assets -0.00885 -0.00619 0.0180 -0.0150 -0.0254 0.0217
(0.898) (0.936) (0.807) (0.846) (0.788) (0.767)
Bidder market-to-book 0.200 -0.0764 -0.107 0.324∗ -0.0392 -0.0761
(0.113) (0.649) (0.540) (0.063) (0.883) (0.635)
Bidder non-interest income 0.356∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.429 0.388∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.151) (0.000)
Bidder maturity mismatch -0.0328 -0.273 -0.317 0.203 0.136 -0.193
(0.975) (0.805) (0.766) (0.802) (0.931) (0.788)
Target pre-merger performance -0.00918∗ -0.00883∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.071) (0.010) (0.001)
Target market-to-book 0.512∗∗ 0.552∗∗ 0.577∗∗ 0.655∗∗
(0.038) (0.031) (0.033) (0.013)
Target maturity mismatch 1.647 1.509 0.0855 0.267
(0.122) (0.125) (0.954) (0.795)
Observations 158 140 140 158 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.0454 0.0662 0.0940
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.25: Analysis of ∆MAES - Logistic regression
The dependent variable is Increase 75, a dummy variable equal to 1 if ∆MAES is greater than 75th percentile
and 0 otherwise. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and 2015. MAES
is defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector
index. Pre-merger period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and
post-merger period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. “Div” is a measure of
diversification. Odd ratios reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div 0.901 1.477 0.883 1.508
(0.812) (0.505) (0.791) (0.499)
Div * Bidder pre-merger performance 1.039 1.051∗
(0.140) (0.072)
Bidder pre-merger performance 0.996 0.967 1.008 0.972
(0.737) (0.153) (0.593) (0.260)
Relative size 0.252 0.169 0.262 0.176
(0.627) (0.537) (0.653) (0.564)
Bidder assets 0.765 0.767 0.825 0.846
(0.114) (0.128) (0.293) (0.385)
Bidder market-to-book 1.897∗∗ 1.930∗∗ 1.197 1.193
(0.023) (0.022) (0.652) (0.668)
Bidder non-interest income 1.581∗ 1.624∗ 1.699∗ 1.734∗
(0.074) (0.070) (0.063) (0.064)
Bidder maturity mismatch 0.791 0.749 0.759 0.760
(0.925) (0.911) (0.919) (0.923)
Target pre-merger performance 0.982 0.984
(0.114) (0.162)
Target market-to-book 1.796 1.821
(0.283) (0.270)
Target maturity mismatch 0.297 0.203
(0.689) (0.624)
Observations 158 158 140 140
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 67
Table 1.26: Robustness to imputing missing values in targets’ pre-acquisition performance
measure
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with pre-merger perfromance below the 25th percentile. MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger
period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period
is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crisis 0.719 0.135 -0.208 -0.239 -0.582
(0.314) (0.853) (0.797) (0.744) (0.655)
∆MAES 0.430∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.774∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.049) (0.009) (0.106)
Crisis*∆MAES -0.607∗ -0.630∗ -0.612∗∗ -0.689∗∗ -1.227
(0.061) (0.056) (0.045) (0.032) (0.148)
∆NSR -0.0138 -0.0267 -0.00551 -0.0292 -0.00687
(0.417) (0.274) (0.825) (0.218) (0.919)
Relative size -3.922 -5.338 -2.839 -4.848 -1.941
(0.332) (0.408) (0.754) (0.437) (0.766)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0262∗∗∗ -0.0338∗∗∗ -0.0349∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗ -0.0899∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.342 -0.689∗∗ -0.405 -1.339∗∗
(0.188) (0.016) (0.123) (0.015)
Bidder assets 0.0000930 0.189 -0.122 0.00827
(1.000) (0.364) (0.417) (0.980)
Bidder market-to-book 0.0912 -0.298 -0.125 -0.613
(0.427) (0.448) (0.366) (0.336)




Specialty Finance deal 1.976∗
(0.058)
Financial Technology deal 2.231
(0.218)








Constant -0.644∗∗∗ -0.513 5.055 1.211 0.304
(0.005) (0.816) (0.186) (0.580) (0.951)
Observations 780 645 490 639 172
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.021 0.038 0.046 0.112
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 68
Table 1.27: Robustness to excluding poor-performing targets
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986
and 2015, where targets’ pre-merger performance is above 25th percentile. MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-
merger period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-
merger period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990,
2001, 2007-2008, and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.800 0.207 0.00950 -0.177
(0.278) (0.784) (0.991) (0.816)
∆MAES 0.416∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.005) (0.036) (0.007)
Crisis*∆MAES -0.540∗ -0.591∗ -0.538∗ -0.638∗∗
(0.095) (0.071) (0.070) (0.046)
∆NSR -0.0147 -0.0296 -0.00716 -0.0314
(0.399) (0.232) (0.772) (0.192)
Relative size -1.665 -0.983 0.538 -0.934
(0.628) (0.868) (0.954) (0.876)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0415∗∗∗ -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0412∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.239 -0.574∗∗ -0.294
(0.363) (0.048) (0.269)
Bidder assets -0.0255 0.124 -0.137
(0.867) (0.557) (0.373)
Bidder market-to-book 0.104 -0.129 -0.0815
(0.365) (0.736) (0.558)




Specialty Finance deal 1.703
(0.109)
Financial Technology deal 1.799
(0.324)




Constant -0.443∗ -0.0901 4.465 1.460
(0.055) (0.968) (0.262) (0.515)
Exclude poor performing targets? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 730 600 446 594
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.027 0.039 0.046
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.28: Robustness to alternative threshold for identifying poor-performing targets (10th
percentile)
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with pre-merger performance below the 10th percentile. MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger
period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period
is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.781 0.196 -0.102 -0.170
(0.266) (0.782) (0.895) (0.811)
Low -5.092∗∗∗ -4.950∗∗∗ -3.879∗∗∗ -4.479∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
∆MAES 0.466∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.026) (0.005)
Crisis*∆MAES -0.611∗ -0.643∗∗ -0.629∗∗ -0.698∗∗
(0.056) (0.049) (0.036) (0.029)
Low*∆MAES -2.056∗ -2.301∗ -2.282∗∗ -2.227∗
(0.091) (0.060) (0.048) (0.072)
∆NSR -0.0145 -0.0274 -0.00632 -0.0295
(0.384) (0.253) (0.794) (0.208)
Relative size -3.948 -5.221 -3.509 -4.800
(0.327) (0.418) (0.703) (0.442)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0431∗∗∗ -0.0388∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.311 -0.660∗∗ -0.374
(0.228) (0.021) (0.153)
Bidder assets -0.00823 0.185 -0.121
(0.956) (0.366) (0.417)
Bidder market-to-book 0.0966 -0.228 -0.106
(0.402) (0.554) (0.444)




Specialty Finance deal 1.816∗
(0.086)
Financial Technology deal 2.006
(0.271)




Constant -0.548∗∗ -0.333 4.620 1.255
(0.017) (0.879) (0.220) (0.563)
Observations 780 645 490 639
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.044 0.060 0.065
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.29: Robustness to alternative threshold for identifying poor-performing targets (50th
percentile)
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with below 25th percentile of pre-merger performance MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger
period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period
is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011. All specifications control for bidder assets and market-to-book ratio.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.825 0.265 0.00907 -0.0858
(0.240) (0.712) (0.991) (0.905)
Low -3.323∗∗∗ -3.366∗∗∗ -2.573∗∗∗ -2.839∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆MAES 0.485∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
Crisis*∆MAES -0.627∗ -0.675∗∗ -0.656∗∗ -0.722∗∗
(0.051) (0.038) (0.030) (0.024)
Low*∆MAES -0.799 -1.361∗∗ -1.253∗ -1.333∗∗
(0.144) (0.045) (0.067) (0.049)
∆NSR -0.0148 -0.0330 -0.0151 -0.0341
(0.364) (0.163) (0.524) (0.144)
Relative size -2.808 -2.843 -2.695 -2.874
(0.404) (0.594) (0.728) (0.590)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0315∗∗∗ -0.0412∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0403∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.378 -0.695∗∗ -0.422
(0.138) (0.013) (0.102)
Bidder assets 0.0143 0.153 -0.0800
(0.924) (0.454) (0.597)
Bidder market-to-book 0.0725 -0.214 -0.102
(0.517) (0.567) (0.456)




Specialty Finance deal 1.447
(0.176)
Financial Technology deal 1.674
(0.360)




Observations 780 645 490 639
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.062 0.072 0.075
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.30: Robustness to excluding 2011 as a crisis period.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with pre-merger performance below the 25th percentile. MAES is defined as
the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-
merger period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger
period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, and
2007-2008.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.232 -0.230 -0.265 -0.502
(0.756) (0.765) (0.736) (0.511)
Low -4.177∗∗∗ -4.378∗∗∗ -3.555∗∗∗ -3.892∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆MAES 0.413∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.005) (0.024) (0.006)
Crisis*∆MAES -0.587∗ -0.627∗ -0.635∗∗ -0.685∗∗
(0.072) (0.055) (0.032) (0.031)
Low*∆MAES -0.746 -1.443 -1.333 -1.397
(0.372) (0.199) (0.227) (0.212)
∆NSR -0.0141 -0.0280 -0.00818 -0.0298
(0.406) (0.245) (0.734) (0.203)
Relative size -3.231 -3.632 -1.674 -3.392
(0.371) (0.520) (0.835) (0.542)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0437∗∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.332 -0.678∗∗ -0.388
(0.194) (0.016) (0.135)
Bidder assets -0.0283 0.153 -0.134
(0.848) (0.450) (0.370)
Bidder market-to-book 0.0833 -0.263 -0.111
(0.460) (0.488) (0.421)




Specialty Finance deal 1.678
(0.108)
Financial Technology deal 1.838
(0.311)




Constant -0.318 0.205 4.961 1.658
(0.166) (0.925) (0.181) (0.448)
Observations 780 645 490 639
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.054 0.070 0.073
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.31: Market reaction to changes in systemic risk - excluding repeat acquirers
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with pre-merger perfromance below the 25th percentile. MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger
period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period
is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011. All specifications control for bidder assets and market-to-book ratio.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distress -0.229 -0.982 -1.212 -1.294∗
(0.757) (0.203) (0.101) (0.090)
∆MAES 0.509∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004)
Distress*∆MAES -0.520 -0.687∗ -0.795∗∗ -0.752∗∗
(0.132) (0.067) (0.015) (0.033)
∆IR -0.0238 -0.0447∗ -0.0272 -0.0464∗
(0.169) (0.090) (0.296) (0.077)
Relative size -2.253 -4.208 -6.697 -5.597
(0.540) (0.536) (0.393) (0.334)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0386∗∗ -0.0416∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.353 -0.684∗∗ -0.373
(0.259) (0.040) (0.234)
Bidder assets 0.125 0.225 -0.00371
(0.528) (0.445) (0.984)
Bidder market-to-book -0.00898 -0.589 -0.289∗
(0.931) (0.221) (0.063)




Specialty Finance deal 1.613
(0.200)
Financial Technology deal 2.350
(0.418)




Constant -0.399 -1.739 1.536 0.0750
(0.150) (0.541) (0.748) (0.978)
Observations 572 450 345 446
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.038 0.046 0.080
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.32: Value of diversifying acquisitions - Robustness to alternative diversification measures.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986
and 2015. MAES is defined as the difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of
a financial sector index. Pre-merger period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition
announcement, and post-merger period is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.
Correlation 50 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if correlation of bidder and target monthly stock return
over 36 months before acquisition announcement is less than 50th percentile (diversifying acquisition) and
0 otherwise. Market overlap is a categorical variable for geography diversification, which is set to 0 for “In
market”, 1 for “Partial overlap” and 2 for “Market expansion.” Geo div is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
“Not In-state” buyer and 0 otherwise. “Activity Div” is a dummy for activity diversification.
Correlation Measure Geography Div. Activity Div.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆MAES -0.820 -1.448∗∗ -1.493∗∗ -0.206 -0.578 -0.685
(0.176) (0.026) (0.031) (0.757) (0.467) (0.297)
Crisis 0.116 0.260 0.0403 0.0443 -0.161 -0.936
(0.939) (0.864) (0.979) (0.976) (0.914) (0.523)
Crisis*∆MAES -1.462∗ -1.110 -1.417 -0.568 -0.704 -1.590∗
(0.100) (0.226) (0.127) (0.591) (0.500) (0.063)
Correlation 50 -0.427 -0.329 -0.398
(0.678) (0.745) (0.694)
Correlation 50*∆MAES 2.127∗∗ 2.346∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗
(0.015) (0.004) (0.025)
Target pre-merger performance 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗ 0.0442∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.053)
Geo div 0.0261 0.0307
(0.979) (0.975)
Geo div*∆MAES 2.268∗∗ 1.977∗∗
(0.015) (0.039)
Market overlap -0.887 -0.704
(0.195) (0.270)




Activity Div * ∆MAES 1.664∗
(0.055)
Relative size -15.80∗ -18.58∗ -16.22∗ -17.55∗ -15.67∗ -16.95∗
(0.096) (0.063) (0.098) (0.072) (0.099) (0.074)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0868∗∗∗ -0.0898∗∗∗ -0.0966∗∗∗ -0.0884∗∗∗ -0.0935∗∗∗ -0.0601∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.047)
Bidder assets 0.156 0.251 0.321 0.265 0.313 0.0713
(0.694) (0.539) (0.446) (0.458) (0.394) (0.826)
Bidder market-to-book 0.315 0.331 0.183 0.158 0.0187 0.169
(0.652) (0.634) (0.793) (0.823) (0.979) (0.784)
Bidder non-interest income 0.278 0.533 0.573 0.146 0.324 0.0629
(0.509) (0.216) (0.185) (0.727) (0.455) (0.660)
Bidder maturity mismatch 4.285 3.438 3.249 3.616 3.870
(0.336) (0.439) (0.481) (0.420) (0.394)
Constant -5.105 -6.746 -6.802 -6.439 -6.526 -2.667
(0.414) (0.286) (0.298) (0.233) (0.247) (0.586)
Observations 149 149 143 157 151 179
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.207 0.219 0.152 0.166 0.118
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.33: Analysis of ∆MAES - OLS & Quantile regressions using a correlation-based diversifi-
cation measure.
The dependent variable is ∆MAES. The analysis is performed using OLS and quantile regression at the
75th percentile. Acquisitions are announced and completed between 1986 and 2015. MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger
period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period
is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion.
OLS Regression Quintile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Correlation 50 -0.262 -0.331 -0.275 -0.319 -0.223 -0.273
(0.211) (0.147) (0.291) (0.231) (0.284) (0.265)
Correlation 50 * Bidder pre-merger performance 0.00684 -0.00615
(0.600) (0.573)
Geo div -0.132 -0.0779 -0.0800 -0.116 0.0141 -0.212
(0.539) (0.740) (0.735) (0.707) (0.946) (0.360)
Bidder pre-merger performance 0.000199 0.00560 0.00118 -0.00221 -0.00422 0.00282
(0.976) (0.498) (0.900) (0.744) (0.508) (0.752)
Relative size -0.615 -1.350 -1.189 -2.671 -2.823∗ -2.547
(0.481) (0.168) (0.251) (0.301) (0.070) (0.250)
Bidder assets -0.0490 -0.0745 -0.0718 -0.0144 -0.0796 -0.0757
(0.535) (0.409) (0.427) (0.865) (0.223) (0.288)
Bidder market-to-book 0.237∗ -0.00580 -0.00318 0.316∗ 0.180 0.119
(0.079) (0.972) (0.985) (0.091) (0.384) (0.568)
Bidder non-interest income 0.355∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Bidder maturity mismatch 0.0279 0.0247 -0.00157 0.139 -0.277 -0.201
(0.980) (0.983) (0.999) (0.897) (0.846) (0.889)
Target pre-merger performance -0.0109∗∗ -0.0105∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0134∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.061) (0.000) (0.005)
Target market-to-book 0.472∗ 0.457∗ 0.443∗ 0.500∗∗
(0.052) (0.060) (0.052) (0.034)
Target maturity mismatch 2.148∗ 2.099∗ 1.028 1.487
(0.055) (0.059) (0.380) (0.264)
Observations 149 134 134 149 134 134
Adjusted R2 0.0380 0.0663 0.0609
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.34: Market reaction to changes in systemic risk by source of distress
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. Low refers to targets with pre-merger perfromance below the 25th percentile. MAES is defined as the
difference between MES of the acquirer and Expected Shortfall (ES) of a financial sector index. Pre-merger
period is defined as the interval [-180,-11] relative to the acquisition announcement, and post-merger period
is the interval [+11,+180] relative to the acquisition completion. The crisis years are 1990, 2001, 2007-2008,
and 2011. All specifications control for bidder assets and market-to-book ratio.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 0.888 0.366 0.171 0.0140
(0.202) (0.605) (0.826) (0.984)
Low -4.128∗∗∗ -4.281∗∗∗ -3.489∗∗∗ -3.817∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
∆MAES 0.155 0.240 0.111 0.203
(0.301) (0.156) (0.470) (0.222)
∆NSR -0.00995 -0.0127 0.00940 -0.0127
(0.630) (0.615) (0.705) (0.602)
Relative size -3.682 -3.957 -1.973 -3.755
(0.311) (0.492) (0.811) (0.511)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0390∗∗∗ -0.0422∗∗∗ -0.0385∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Geo Diversification -0.356 -0.684∗∗ -0.409
(0.171) (0.016) (0.120)
Bidder assets -0.0838 0.0844 -0.182
(0.572) (0.677) (0.224)
Bidder market-to-book 0.0891 -0.197 -0.0940
(0.444) (0.603) (0.506)




Specialty Finance deal 1.621
(0.136)
Financial Technology deal 1.773
(0.331)




Constant -0.381∗ 1.000 5.748 2.377
(0.099) (0.650) (0.122) (0.279)
Observations 780 645 490 639
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.046 0.060 0.063
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show the distribution of ∆MAES for diversifying and focusing acquisi-
tions, and for all acquisitions respectively. It is clear from these graphs that the distributions
sufficiently cover both positive and negative values of ∆MAES making the inferences econo-
metrically robust.
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Figure 1.4: ∆MAES for diversifying and focusing acquisitions
This graph shows the distribution of ∆MAES across diversifying and focusing acquisitions.
Figure 1.5: ∆MAES for all acquisitions.
This graph shows the distribution of ∆MAES for all acquisitions in our sample. The vertical
line marks the 75th percentile of the distribution.
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Table 1.35: Value of diversifying acquisitions.
The dependent variable is CAR. The analysis uses acquisitions announced and completed between 1986 and
2015. In specifications (1)-(2): GFAF (Geography and activity focus), GFAD (Geography focus and activity
diversification), GDAF (Geography diversification and activity focus) and GDAD (Geography and activity
diversification). In specification (3), “Div” is a dummy variable for diversification without controlling for
geography. In specification (4): “Activity Div” is a dummy variable for activity diversification constructed








Relative size -5.354∗∗∗ -4.960∗∗∗ -5.275∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Bidder pre-merger performance -0.0107 -0.0103 -0.0110
(0.381) (0.398) (0.373)
Bidder assets 0.256∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.293∗∗
(0.055) (0.021) (0.018)
Bidder market-to-book -0.0846 -0.0687 -0.0945
(0.694) (0.744) (0.659)
Bidder non-interest income -0.0610 -0.0487 -0.0556
(0.101) (0.170) (0.126)






Constant -5.114∗∗ -5.560∗∗∗ -5.290∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.005) (0.009)
Observations 863 869 863
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.015 0.016
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
Table 1.36: Description of related literature
Theory & Description
Bank consolidation & financial stability (systemic risk)
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999)
The potential effects of consolidation on risk of individual institutions and financial stability are highlighted as
following:
1. M&As may either increase or decrease the risk of institutions, largely depending upon whether any
diversification gains are offset by the institutions’ pursuit of additional risks. Their results suggest that
in many cases, consolidating institutions chose to move along the risk-expected return frontier and take
most of the benefits of diversification gains as higher returns by shifting their portfolios toward higher
risk-higher expected return investments.
2. M&As lead to larger institutions with larger systemic consequences of the failures such as spreading
problems to more counterparties, particularly for those heavily involving in clearing and settlement
functions. Larger institutions may also tend to fund themselves in ways that increase their reliance on
intraday credit, which could increase the demand for intraday credit and increase systemic exposures.
3. Consolidation may also impose costs on the financial system by expanding the financial safety net. some
institutions may try to increase the value of their access to the government’s financial safety net (includ-
ing deposit insurance, discount window access, payments system guarantees) through consolidation. If
financial market participants perceive very large organizations to be ”too big to fail” (i.e., that explicit
or implicit government guarantees will protect debtholders or shareholders of these organizations) there
may be incentives to increase size through consolidation in order to lower the cost of funding and increase
the value of shares.
DeNicoló and Kwast (2002)
They estimate firm inter-dependencies by correlations of stock returns, and relate this measure to the consoli-
dation activities in financial sector. They conclude that consolidation at their sample LCBOs appears to have
contributed to LCBOs inter-dependencies.
Wagner (2008)
Presents a model where diversification, even though beneficial by itself, can reduce welfare because it may
encourage banks to take on more risks. He argues this negative side effect of diversification, however, can be
completely avoided by regulation that does not give capital reliefs for more diversified banks.
Wagner (2010)
Shows that the diversification of risks at financial institutions makes systemic crises more likely by increasing
the institutions similarities and exposing them to the same risks. When systemic crises induce costs beyond
individual banking failures (for example, because they cause premature liquidation of assets in the economy),
efficient diversification has to trade-off a lower overall probability of banking failure with a higher probability
of systemic failures. He argues that a bank merger can produce the same outcome as full diversification and a
merger between banks which have reached their optimal degree of diversification is always welfare reducing.
Weiß, Neumann, and Bostandzic (2014)
They study the systemic risk effects of bank mergers using the marginal expected shortfall as well as the lower
tail dependence to capture the merger-related change in an acquirer’s contribution to systemic risk. They find
evidence of a significant increase in the merging banks’, the combined banks’ as well as their competitors’
contribution to systemic risk following mergers, thus confirming the “concentration-fragility” hypothesis.
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Theory & Description
Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2012)
Using a theoretical framework they find that the diversification of credit risk across many borrowers has am-
biguous effects on systemic risk in the presence of mechanisms of loss amplifications such as in the presence of
potential runs among the short-term lenders of the agents in the network. In particular, network structure and
heterogeneity of levels of financial robustness across agents should be carefully taken into account when trying
to devise policies that enhance the resilience of the financial system.
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015)
They find that diversification can contribute to both financial stability and fragility depending on magnitude of
negative shock. As long as the magnitude of negative shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small,
a more densely connected financial network (corresponding to a more diversified pattern of interbank liabilities)
enhances financial stability. However, beyond a certain point, dense interconnections serve as a mechanism for
the propagation of shocks, leading to a more fragile financial system.
Positive effects of diversification & consolidation
Berger (2000)
Finds that integration in financial services industry appears to bring about larger revenue efficiency gains than
cost efficiency gains, and most of the gains appear to be linked to benefits from risk diversification.
Boot and Thakor (2000)
They find that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added
value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but
each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers
but not necessarily for all.
Diamond (1984)
Develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information and
analyses the determinants of delegated monitoring costs. In his model a financial intermediary has a net cost
advantage relative to direct lending and borrowing. Diversification within the intermediary is key to the possible
net advantage of intermediation and serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy.
? and Rochet and Tirole (1996)
Present some evidences suggesting that the monitoring of banks by other banks may be an efficient mechanism
for controlling systemic risk, and this task may be easier and less costly after consolidation .
Systemic risk-shifting
Acharya (2009)
In a theoretical model of systemic risk shows that the limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative
externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where
all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. The idea is that
the banks have incentive to take correlated investments in order to increase the probability of joint survival and
therefore joint failure due to regulatory (implicit) “too-many-to-fail” guarantees, as bankers anticipate greater
forbearance upon joint failure than in individual failure.
CHAPTER 1. DO ACQUIRERS GAIN PRIVATE BENEFIT AT PUBLIC COST? 80
Theory & Description
Value of Diversifying vs. Focusing M&As
Servaes (1996)
Studies the trend of mergers from 1960s to 1980s and observes that the diversification trend of the late 1960s and
early 1970s revereses toward corporate focus in 1980s. He finds that there was a large diversification discount
during the 1960s, but this discount declined to zero during the 1970s.
DeLong (2001)
Shows that mergers that focus both activity and geography enhance stockholder value by 3.0% while the other
types do not create value. She further demonstrates that the loss in value for diversifying bidders is not the
result of a wealth-transfer from bidders to targets.
Diversification & Internal Capital Market
Hubbard and Palia (1999)
Examine mergers during the 1960s and find the highest bidder returns when financially “unconstrained” buyers
acquire “constrained” targets. They conclude that diversifying mergers could create value by forming an effective
internal capital market to overcome the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets, thereby
lowering the cost of capital.
Bhide (1990)
Argues that because of economic, technological, and regulatory changes during the 1970s and 1980s, information
asymmetries have become less of an issue in corporate financing and that the disadvantages of diversification
have started to outweigh the benefits (i.e., the internal capital market).
Diversification & Debt Capacity
Lewellen (1971)
Focuses on financial efficiencies of corporate mergers rather than operational efficiencies. He argues the more
conglomerate the character of the consolidation (i.e., the milder the extent of earnings interdependence present)
the greater the expansion of the partners’debt-carrying ability pursuant to merger. So conglomerates can sustain
higher levels of debt because corporate diversification reduces earnings variability. If the tax shields of debt
increase firm value, this argument predicts that conglomerate firms are more valuable than companies operating
in a single industry.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
Argue that conglomerates may have a higher debt capacity because in bad states of the world they can sell
assets in those industries that suffer the least from liquidity problems. In other words, diversified firms can
avoid fire-sales in bad times, that are ex ante a significant private cost of leverage.
Diversification & Economies of Scope
Teece (1980)
Argues that diversification leads to economics of scope. He examines elements of an efficiency-based theory of
the multiproduct firm. And suggests that if economies of scope are based upon the common and recurrent use
of proprietary knowhow or the common and recurrent use of a specialized and indivisible physical asset, then
multiproduct enterprise (diversification) is an efficient way of organizing economic activity.
Geographic Diversification
Berger and DeYoung (2001, 2006)
found that the greatly increased geographic footprints of U.S. bank holding companies due to industry consol-
idation resulted in managerial difficulties that reduced operational efficiency. However, they also found that
technological advancement has gradually reduced the importance of these inefficiencies over time. Because
geographic expansion inevitably leads to multi-market contact, there is some concern that competitive rivalry
may diminish as banking companies enter each others home markets, and allow the home bank to dominate
and drive prices, i.e., mutual forebearance.
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Theory & Description
Diversification & Managerial Benefit
Jensen (1986)
Suggests that companies diversify to increase the private benefits of managers. His theory explains why “diver-
sification” programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business
(i.e., focusing) or liquidation-motivated takeovers.
• Managers have incentive to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size. Growth increases man-
agers’ power by increasing the resources under their control. It is also associated with increases in
managers’compensation, because changes in compensation are positively related to the growth in sales.
• Product and factor market disciplinary forces are often weaker in new activities and activities that involve
substantial economic rents or quasi rents.
Amihud and Lev (1981)
Hypothesize that managers, as opposed to investors, engage in diversifying conglomerate mergers to decrease
their largely undiversifiable “employment risk” (i.e., risk of losing job, professional reputation, etc). Such risk
reduction activities are considered as managerial perquisites in the context of the agency cost model. Their
empirical results suggest that “managerial” incentives are driving conglomerate merger.
Shleifer and Vishny (1989)
Argue that pursuit of entrenchment often leads managers to expand existing lines of business excessively. They
suggest that managers have an incentive to diversify into areas where they have a comparative management
advantage since diversifying into those industries will make their skills more indispensable to the firm.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)
Find that the returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies (diversifying vs. focusing
mergers are defined based on 4-digit SIC code or correlation coefficients being above the median for the sample).
They find that bad managers are also bad acquirers, consistent with the notion that poor performance drives
managers to try something new. They conclude that managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce
bidding firms’ values.
Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian (2003)
Find bank mergers that increased the product line focus (as well as the geographic focus) of the acquiring bank
resulted in significantly higher stock market reactions. They examines whether shareholder value-maximizing
corporate governance mechanisms assist in reducing the managerial incentive to enter value-destroying bank
acquisitions and find that corporate governance variables (such as CEO share and option ownership and a smaller
board size) in the bidding bank are less effective in diversifying acquisitions than in focusing acquisitions.
Hendershott et al. (2002)
Study the market reaction to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, and conclude that benefits from diversifica-
tion into new product lines are more likely to accrue to non-bank financial firms than to banking firms. They
find that insurance firms and investment banks experienced positive market reactions to the new law, whereas
the stock prices of commercial banking companies were left statistically unaffected.
Jensen and Ruback (1983)
Argue that the gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power.
And suggest it is difficult to find managerial actions related to corporate control that harm stockholders; the
exceptions are those actions that eliminate an actual or potential bidder, for example, through the use of
targeted large block repurchases or standstill agreements.
Chapter 2
Source of systemic risk: Operations
2.1 Introduction
During times of financial crisis, losses tend to spread across financial institutions, threatening
the global financial system as a whole. The comovement of financial markets is accentuated
during times of crisis, thereby giving rise to systemic risk. Since the 2007-2008 global finan-
cial crisis, regulators and academicians alike have focused on measuring systemic risk, which
is the spillover effect of risk exposures that spread contagiously to other institutions, poten-
tially infecting the entire financial sector. Micro-level measures of systemic risk (e.g., MES by
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2016; CoVar by Tobias and Brunnermeier,
2015) calculate the pair-wise exposure of financial institutions on all other institutions. These
measures of systemic risk can be used by regulators to identify systemically important fi-
nancial institutions, thereby internalizing the externality by levying systemic risk premiums
(possibly contingent capital requirements).
The importance of systemic risk extends beyond the financial sector as excessive aggregate
systemic risk taking is shown to forecast macroeconomic declines (see Allen, Bali, and Tang,
2012). Given its importance, I investigate the source of systemic risk. That is, I delve
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beneath the varying measurements of systemic risk to understand where systemic risk is
generated within financial institutions. I decompose total systemic risk into its underlying
risk sources and examine which source of systemic risk leads to the externalities that are
most damaging to the state of the macroeconomy. I find that operations are the source of the
systemic risk. That is, if regulators have concern about systemic risk taking in the financial
sector, they should focus on operational risk as the breeding ground for the systemic risk
that is most damaging to real economic conditions. In this paper, I decompose the measure
of aggregate systemic risk-taking of financial sector from Allen et al. (2012) into market risk,
credit risk and operational risk components. I find that only the operational risk component
of this measure can forecast future macroeconomic downturns, whereas the non-operational
component have no predictive ability.
The analysis can be understood in the context of the most recent financial crisis. Some
experts claim that the ongoing global macroeconomic decline stemmed directly from credit
risk exposure in the form of imprudent subprime mortgage lending that was securitized with-
out accountability (e.g., Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam, 2011). While not discounting the
importance of credit risk in initiating the financial crisis, other experts claim that it was the
resulting financial market illiquidity and fire-sale mentality that triggered falling asset prices
throughout financial markets (see Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). Thus, market risk could have
triggered macroeconomic declines worldwide. Still other experts claim that the operational
problems in registering and documenting mortgages created “limbo loans” without clear
ownership claims to the underlying property collateral backing the mortgages (see Allen,
Peristiani, and Tang, 2015). These limbo loans act as an impediment to aggregate lending
activity, thereby depressing macroeconomic activity. In this paper, I test whether any or all
three of these risk sources, operating separately or in unison, can explain macroeconomic
declines.
I decompose systemic risk into credit risk, market risk and operational risk components
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using the methodology of Allen and Bali (2007) to measure operational risk as the residual
risk after accounting for market and credit risk exposures. I devise empirical risk measures.
For credit risk, I utilize monthly volatility in the AAA-BBB credit spread. For market risk,
I utilize monthly shocks to interest rate, exchange rates and stock price indices. This is
a comprehensive measure of operational risk based on equity returns that includes model
estimation error, fraud, dishonesty, strategic errors, reputational losses, as well as day-to-day
operational flaws. I validate this measure using fraudulent accounting restatements.
All risk measures are estimated for each individual financial institution using a monthly
time series of equity returns over its lagged value and the specified risk factors. Since I found
that credit risk and market risk have no explanatory power taken individually, I then combine
them into a single measure of non-operational risk to be contrasted with the operational risk
component. That is, I decompose the measure of aggregate systemic risk taking of the entire
financial sector (hereinafter CATFIN) into the operational and non operational components
(OpCATFIN and NonOpCATFIN respectively). I test the predictive power of each of these
components for future economic downturns as well as their use as an early warning system.
Only OpCATFIN has predictive power, forecasting economic downturns 12 months into the
future.
The paper is organized as follows. The estimation of operational and non-operational
risks is presented in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, the aggregate systemic risk measure CATFIN
is estimated and decomposed into OpCATFIN and NonOpCATFIN. Section 2.7 presents the
main empirical results, testing the predictive ability of OpCATFIN and NonOpCATFIN for
future economic downturns. Then, I develop an early warning system based on OpCATFIN.
Furthermore, I show the underlying mechanism through which OpCATFIN is transmitted
to the real economy. Section 2.9 concludes.
CHAPTER 2. SOURCE OF SYSTEMIC RISK: OPERATIONS 85
2.2 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. Some of these studies focus on defining
and measuring operational risk. Jarrow (2008) formally defines and provides an economic
and mathematical characterization of operational risk. He characterizes operational risk
as either related to the firms operating technology or the agency costs. Allen and Bali
(2007) use equity returns to estimate operational risk. This study is closely related to the
literature that aim to understand the nature of operational risk and its association with the
broader economy. Using supervisory data from large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs),
Mihov, Curti, and Abdymomunov (2017) document a significant association between BHCs’
operational losses and the U.S. macroeconomic environment. They find that in adverse
conditions, BHCs face higher and more volatile operational losses. The frequency of loss
events increases. So does average severity, driven by large individual loss events. Using a
copula framework, Abdymomunov and Ergen (2017) find that occurrences of large losses
are positively correlated across banks. They do not, however, directly test the systemic risk
implications of operational risk events.
The main contribution of this paper is to the growing literature that examines the nature
of systemic risk (see, e.g., Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010;
Acharya, 2009). Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) examine the bank-level determinants
of systemic risk. Cummins, Wei, and Xie (2007) explore intra and inter-sector spillover effects
of operational risk events. McConnell (2013) describes an example of systemic operational
risk.
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2.3 Is operational risk the source of systemic risk?
The financial system has been shaken by a number of operational failures over the past
decades. Due to their crucial role as “delegated monitors” (see Diamond, 1984) and partly
due to the opacity of their business (see Morgan, 2002), financial institutions are even more
vulnerable to losses resulting from operational failures which undermine public trust and
confidence. According to Chernobai, Rachev, and Fabozzi (2008), more than 100 operational
losses exceeding $100 million in value each and a number of losses exceeding $1 billion, have
impacted financial firms globally since the end of 1980s. Operational risk is also the source
of approximately 50% of all hedge-fund failures. Some of these operational failures have
triggered a more wide-spread systemic risk impacting other firms in the financial sector and
the overall economy.
This section outlines two channels through which operational risk in financial institutions
may lead to an increase in aggregate systemic risk of the financial sector. The first channel
is the so-called “information” channel that relies upon the information revealed about the
similar operational risks in other financial firms after an operation risk event. The second
channel is the “contagion” channel.
• Information channel
Operational risk events may have significant informational externalities or spillover effects
on other financial institutions. An operational risk event may make customers and investors
wary of similar risks in other firms even in the absence of such risks and hence makes them
worse off. Opacity of financial sector can exacerbate this spillover channel.
Extant research reveals that operational loss events have a strong, statistically significant
negative impact on the announcing firms equity returns (see Cummins, Lewis, and Wei,
2006; Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005). Interestingly, these studies find that the market
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value loss is significantly higher than the amount of the operational loss, implying that
these operational loss events may convey adverse information about future cash flows of
those firms. Similar to the information channel of bankruptcy impact (see, e.g., Lang and
Stulz, 1992), an operational risk event may reveal negative information about potentially
similar faulty operations in other financial firms and, consequently, increases the markets
expectation of such operational losses which are not yet discovered or materialized.
• Contagion channel
Operational losses at a financial firm may have a negative impact on the counterparties in the
form of credit risk. Some studies have reported a positive correlation between operational risk
and non-operational risks such as credit risk. Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu (2011) identify firm-
specific determinants of operational risk that implies a positive correlation between credit
risk and operational risk. For example, they find that the firms suffering from operational risk
events tend to be younger and more complex and particularly, have higher financial distress
risk as measured by a wide range of firm characteristics including equity volatility, Tier 1
capital, market-to-book ratio, cash holdings and the Merton (1974) distance-to-default.
In their study of corporate losses, Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) find that the
probability of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than
would be estimated under the assumption that default correlation is only due to exposure
to (ex-ante) observable risk factors. They find strong evidence for the presence of common
latent factors, even when controlling for observable factors that provide the most accurate
model of firm-level probabilities of default. These latent factors are most often the correlated
operational risks across financial institutions. An example of an important factor leading to
2008 financial crisis is the degree to which borrowers and mortgage brokers provided proper
documentation of borrowers credit qualities. In other words, failing to request and assess
the proper documentation of borrowers credit qualities, i.e. a common operational failure,
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has led to build up of systemic risk in financial institutions.
Another instance of systemic operational risk is evident in defaults of Enron and World-
Com. Fraudulent accounting practices at Enron led to one of the largest bankruptcies in
U.S. history in 2001.1 Duffie et al. (2009) argue that these events may have revealed faulty
accounting practices that could have been in use at other firms, and thus may have had
an impact on the conditional default probabilities of other firms and therefore on overall
U.S. corporate debt portfolio losses. This is in line with the empirical findings of Cummins
et al. (2007), whcih find that operational risk events cause strong negative intra and inter-
sector spillover effects (i.e., the stock prices of non-announcing firms respond negatively to
operational loss announcements) that is information-based rather than purely contagious.2
McConnell (2013) describes the LIBOR scandal and argues that it is an example of
systemic operational risk, in particular people risk. Allen and Bali (2007) find evidence3 that
operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of large unexpected catastrophic losses,
although when they occur, the losses are smaller than those resulting from a combination of
market risk, credit risk or other risk events.
Motivated by all these findings in the extant literature, I investigate whether operational
risk is the source of systemic risk.
1This led to substantial losses and accusation of several other financial institutions including Merill Lynch,
NatWest, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase and Salomon Smith Barney, among others.
2In their study of the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), Kabir and Hassan (2005)
find that commercial and investment banks with exposure to LTCM lost significant market value around the
event. Smaller S&L institutions and bigger insurance companies were also affected by the crisis, implying a
form of contagion effect in the financial sector.
3They find that operational risk loss levels are lower than overall catastrophic loss levels. Moreover, the
area under the lower tail of the operational risk distribution was higher than the area under the lower tail
of the return distribution for extremely low returns (equity returns below 12%), thereby suggesting that
operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of extremely large declines in returns than other risk
events.
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2.4 Operational risk measure
2.4.1 Methodology
Defining and estimating operational risk of financial firms is a very controversial topic. The
definitions range from very narrow to extremely broad classifications. As of December 2017,
the Basel Committee defines operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate
or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” This definition
includes legal risk, but excludes strategic, reputational and systemic risk, as well as all
indirect losses or opportunity costs.
In this study, in order to explore the source of systemic risk, I need a more comprehensive
measure of operational risk including not only high frequency/low intensity events, but more
importantly low frequency/high intensity events. Hence, I adopt Allen and Bali (2007)’s
definition of operational risk as a residual measure. After all the identifiable sources of risk
(i.e., credit and market risk including term structure risk, exchange rate risk, equity risk, etc.)
are accounted for, the remainder is defined as operational risk. This yields a comprehensive
measure of operational risk that includes model estimation error, fraud, dishonesty, strategic
errors, reputational losses as well as day-to-day operational flaws.
This top-down4 measure of operational risk relies on equity returns to measure the im-
pact of operational loss events on overall firm value, rather than just accounting for the
cost. Other studies reveal that operational loss events have a strong, statistically significant
negative stock price impact on announcing firms (see, e.g., Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005).
Interestingly, they find that the market value of the losses significantly exceeds the amount
of operational loss, implying that such losses convey adverse information about future cash
4Allen, Boudoukh and Saunders (2004) note that whereas bottom-up models may be appropriate for the
purposes of risk diagnostics and design of internal managerial controls, top-down models may be effective in
estimating economic capital requirements.
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flows of announcing firms.
I estimate the following model using OLS regression for each financial institution using a
monthly time series of equity returns over the period of 1970-2013 for all firms in the sample
with at least 50 consecutive monthly equity returns.






πi,tRit + εt (2.1)
Where:
• rt and rt−1 are the monthly current and lagged equity returns of each of the financial
firms in our sample over the period t = Jan 1970 through May 2013;
• δxit, (i = 1, 2, . . . , 17), is the first order difference of the 17 variables used to estimate
credit and market risks;
• FFit represents the three Fama-French (1993) factors (overall excess return on the
market, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD);
• Rit represents the average monthly return for each industry sector: depository insti-
tutions, insurance companies and securities firms. The equity returns on each of the
three industry sectors are determined by dividing the sample of financial firms into
three groups: depository institutions (SIC codes 60XX, 66XX and 6712), insurance
companies (SIC codes 63XX and 64XX) and securities firms (all other 6XXX-level SIC
codes).
• The 17 δxit variables are taken from the macro variables defined in Table 2.1 and are
grouped by risk sources as follows.
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Overall Credit Risk Measure:
• RAAA −RBBB = the spread between the AAA and the BBB corporate bond yield
Firm Specific Credit Risk Measures:
• Market value of equity/Book value of assets = 1 leverage ratio
• Net income/sales
• Log of book value of total assets
Interest Rate Risk Measures:
• R 3MTB=3 month US Treasury bill rates
• R 10YTB=10 year US Treasury bond rates
• INTGSTDEM193N=Treasury Bills rates for Germany
• INTGSBDEM193N=Government Bonds rates for Germany
• INTGSTJPM193N=Treasury Bills rates for Japan
• INTGSBJPM193N =Government Bonds rates for Japan
• INTGSTGBM193N=Treasury Bills rates for UK
• INTGSBGBM193N=Government Bonds rates for UK
Exchange Rate Risk Measures:
• Exgeus=Deutschemark/US dollar exchange rate5
• Exukus=British pound/US dollar exchange rate
• Exjpus=Japanese yen/US dollar exchange rate
Market Risk Measures:6
• Equity Index Japan
• S&P 500 Index
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The non-operational risk for each financial institution is then calculated as the total
monthly return minus the operational risk.
2.4.2 Validating the operational risk measure
Estimating operational risk as a residual measure, Allen and Bali (2007) show that approx-
imately 18% of financial institutions returns represent compensation for operational risk.
This result is similar to the estimates obtained using different empirical methodologies by
Kuritzkes (2002) and deFontnouvelle, Dejesus-Rueff, Jordan, and Rosengren (2006). To fur-
ther validate this operational risk measure, I use accounting restatement announcements due
to irregularity or fraud reported by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 2006) and
explore whether it can capture this major operational incidence.
During the time period of 1997 to 2006, the restatement data matched 118 firm-month
observations in my sample. I use propensity score matching to determine a control group
based on three variables: size (defined as the log of total market capitalization), industry (3
groups of depository, insurance and securities firms) and also the total excess return of the
firm during the past year. I then check whether the operational risk of the firms that were
required to make accounting restatement is significantly different from the operational risk
of the control group. The results are presented in Table 2.4 and show that the operational
risk of those firms are indeed higher than the control groups 1 month before the restatement
announcement (i.e., when market can anticipate it) and not significantly different afterwards.
Therefore, the results provide evidence that the accounting irregularity/fraud impacts
the equity price before the restatement announcement and stock price falls to adjust for
the compensation investors require for the higher operational risk. This is in line with the
findings of Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang (2009). They show that institutional investors act as
though they partially anticipate potential accounting irregularities and adjust their holdings
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downward prior to the restatement announcement.7
2.5 Aggregate systemic risk measure
CATFIN is estimated as the catastrophic VaR of the entire financial sector. That is, in each
month, I estimate CATFIN as the VaR of financial firms excess return at 99% confidence
level using two parametric distributions (i.e. Skewed Generalized Error Distribution (SGED)
and and Generalized Pareto Distribution(GPD)) and the nonparametric method.8. CATFIN
is estimated as the average of these three VaR measures. Then, the operational and non-
operational components of CATFIN are estimated using the same methodology replacing
total equity returns by its operational and non-operational risk components as estimated in
Section 2.4. Figure 1 depicts these three measures over the sample period.
2.6 Data
I construct the sample of financial firms using CRSP/Compustat merged database. I include
all common stocks traded on either NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq that have primary SIC codes
of 6XXX over the time period from Jan 1970 to May 2013. I obtain monthly data (including
dividends) from CRSP/Compustat and require that a firm’s market capitalization is available
at the beginning of each month and monthly stock return. I also adjust stock returns for
delisting in order to avoid survivorship bias.
Missing data in Compustat reduced the final number of observations to 292,922 (and
2003 firms), predominately because of missing values for assets, net income and sales as well
7One caveat to this validation might be that we do not control for market and credit risk when comparing
the operational risk of the treatment and control group. Further extension of this analysis could use some
measures of credit or market risk in propensity score matching or alternatively, one can control for these
other sources of risk to ensure that differences are driven only by operational risk.
8For a description of methodology, please refer to Allen et al. (2012)
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as the lack of 50 months of continuous monthly returns, all required for the estimation of
operational risk.
In order to estimate the operational risk, I obtain data on all the general risk categories
that financial firms are exposed to, such as overall credit, firm-specific and market risks
(equity indexes risk, foreign exchange rate risk, term structure risk) and Fama-French plus
momentum risk factors. Data and the data sources used are listed in Table 2.1 and descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 2.2.
To validate the operational risk measure, I use accounting restatement data. Restate-
ment announcements data are obtained from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO,
2006) report, which contains accounting restatements announced in the period of January,
1997 to June, 2006. It contains about 2686 restatement announcements of firms that are
required to restate their financial statements because of material accounting irregularity
and/or frauds.9 The GAO database is comprised of the name, ticker symbol, and exchange
of the restating firm, the restatement announcement date, the number of shares outstand-
ing, the initiator of the restatement, and the reason(s) for the restatement. The difference of
this database from the Compustat accounting restatement is that GAO database generally
excludes restatements involving stock splits, changes in accounting principles, and other an-
nounced restatements that were not made to correct errors in the application of accounting
principles.10
9The GAO states that they are focused on “financial restatements resulting from accounting irregularities,
including so-called aggressive accounting practices, intentional and unintentional misuse of facts applied
to financial statements, oversight or misinterpretation of accounting rules, and fraud. As a general rule,
they exclude restatements resulting from accounting policy changes because they did not necessarily reveal
previously undisclosed, economically meaningful data to market participants.”
10Using the Lexis-Nexis “Power Search” command and the “US Newspapers and Wires” database, they
performed keyword searches using variations of “restate” as well as the terms “adjust,” “amend,” and
“revise”- all within 50 words of “financial statement” or “earning.” They excluded restatement announce-
ments that resulted from normal corporate activity or simple presentation issues unless they determined that
there was some irregularity involved.
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2.7 Main empirical results
In this section, using OpCATFIN, I investigate whether operational risk is the source of
systemic risk and therefore drives CATFIN’s predictive power.
2.7.1 Predictive ability of OpCATFIN for economic downturns
First, I test the predictive power of CATFIN, reproduced from Allen et al. (2012), in fore-
casting future economic downturns. Second, I replace CATFIN by its operational component
to see if it is in fact the driver of the predictive power. I use Chicago Fed National Activity
Index (CFNAI) as the macroeconomic variable. “CFNAI is a monthly index designed to
gauge overall economic activity and related inflationary pressure. The CFNAI is a weighted
average of 85 monthly indicators of national economic activity. It is constructed to have an
average value of zero and a standard deviation of one. Since economic activity tends toward
trend growth rate over time, a positive index reading corresponds to growth above trend and
a negative index reading corresponds to growth below trend.11”
I estimate the following n-month ahead multivariate predictive regression of CFNAI on
CATFIN, and control for a all macroeconomic and financial variables outlined in Table 11
as well as 12 lags of dependent variable:
CFNAIt+n = α + λCATFINt + βXt +
12∑
i=1
CFNAIt−i+1 + εt+n (2.2)
where Xt includes the macroeconomic and financial market control variables as defined in
Table 11.
The results are presented in Table 2.5. All CATFIN coefficients are negative and highly
significant after controlling for a wide set of factors, thereby predicting the CFNAI index
11The reference is https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/cfnai/index
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up to twelve months into the future. The adjusted R2 values from the predictive regressions
are economically significant and in the range of 54% to 24% for 1-month to 12-month ahead
regressions.12
Next, I replace CATFIN in Equation 2.2 by OpCATFIN to investigate whether this
component has any predictive power on future macroeconomic downturns. I estimate the
following n-months ahead multivariate predictive regression of CFNAI on OpCATFIN con-
trolling for macroeconomic and financial variables and also 12 lags of the dependent variable:
CFNAIt+n = α + λOpCATFINt + βXt +
12∑
i=1
CFNAIt−i+1 + εt+n (2.3)
where Xt denotes a vector of control variables in month t.
The results are presented in Table 2.6. The coefficients of OpCATFIN are all negative
and significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level for 1 to 11 months ahead regressions. Therefore,
OpCATFIN can predict future economic downturns. The adjusted R2 reported in this table
are at the same level as those in 2.6. As a robustness check, I also include NonOpCATFIN
in the regression. The results are reported in Table 2.9. Both coefficients of OpCATFIN
and NonOpCATFIN are negative, however only the coefficient of OpCATFIN is statistically
significant in most of the regressions. Among the control variables, term spread, FIN Beta,
SIZE and LEV turn out to be significant predictors of future economic downturns. However,
the statistical significance of these macroeconomic and financial variables depend on the
horizon.
One could argue that operational risk and non-operational risk are correlated. Some
studies have reported a positive correlation between operational risk and non-operational
risks such as credit risk. Chernobai et al. (2011) identify firm-specific determinants of oper-
12Allen et al. (2012) show that this predictive power is special to aggressive risk taking of financial sector
and CATFIN constructed based on all other firms doesn’t have any predictive power for future economic
downturns.
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ational risk that implies a positive correlation between credit risk and operational risk. For
example, they find that the firms suffering from operational risk events tend to be younger
and more complex13 and particularly, have a higher financial distress risk as measured by a
wide range of firm characteristics including equity volatility, Tier 1 capital, market-to-book
ratio, cash holdings and the Merton (1974) distance-to-default.
2.7.2 Developing warning system
If operational risk is the real source of systemic risk, we should be able to develop a warning
system similar to the one developed in Allen et al. (2012). This would aid financial firms and
regulators to reliably predict the risk-taking events which have the potential of triggering
systemic instability in the financial sector and cause real economic downturns.
To develop such a warning system, we need to find out a threshold for OpCATFIN.
According to The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 3-month moving average of CFNAI
(CFNAI MA3) of -0.7 or less is an indication of the economic contraction. Following the
methodology used in Allen et al. (2012), I calculate the median OpCATFIN for those months
when CFNAI MA3 is less than -0.7. I take this median as the threshold and then construct
two new variables based on that. OpCATFINplust equals to OpCATFIN in month t if it is
greater than the median and zero otherwise; OpCATFINminust equals OpCATFIN in month
t if it is less than or equal to the median, and zero otherwise. Once these variables are
generated, I estimate the following regression:









Table 2.7 presents the results. OpCATFINplus is the only variable that significantly pre-
13measured by the number of segments reported in Compustat
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dicts lower economic activity 2 to 12 months in advance, whereas other variables do not have a
statistically significant predictive power for all horizons. The coefficient of OpCATFINminus
becomes significant in the 9 to 12 months ahead regressions. These results indicate that when
the (operational) risk of financial firms exceeds a certain threshold, it can predict future eco-
nomic downturns. However, when the risk is below the critical value, it is not likely to
generate an epidemic that affect entire macroeconomic system.
Although OpCATFINplust can predict economic downturns in advance, the main question
is whether the operational risk can be caught soon enough for any preemptive measures by
regulators. In some cases the systemic operational risk build-up in the financial institutions
can be very wide-spread (e.g., as in the case of subprime mortgage lending), however, these
risks will be known to the market (or the firms themselves) and consequently reflected in
equity returns only after a relatively large operational loss event. Subsequently, this event can
impact other firms directly (contagion-based) or indirectly (information-based) and manifest
itself through their equity returns (see Cummins et al., 2007).
2.8 How operational risk affects future economic down-
turns
Kashyap and Stein (2000) argue that an important mechanism for transmission of shocks
from the financial sector into the macroeconomy is aggregate bank lending. To further
validate OpCATFIN as the driver of systemic risk, I test whether OpCATFIN predicts
bank lending activity. I obtain aggregate lending measures for commercial and industrial
loans, real estate loans, consumer loans and total loans and leases from Call Report data
and regress them separately on OpCATFIN controlling for the same macroeconomic and
financial variables and 12 lags of the corresponding dependent variable.
The results are presented in Table 2.8. I find that OpCATFIN forecasts total bank
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lending up to 12 months in advance. Interestingly, the adjusted R2 is highest for commercial
and industrial lending.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I delve beneath the varying measurements of systemic risk to understand
where systemic risk originates within financial institutions. I decompose an aggregate sys-
temic risk measure (CATFIN) into its underlying risk sources and examine which one leads
to the externalities that are most damaging to the state of the macroeconomy. I find that op-
erations are the source of systemic risk and only the operational risk component of CATFIN
can forecast future macroeconomic downturns, whereas the non-operational components of
CATFIN have no predictive ability.
Operational risk is measured as the residual risk after accounting for market and credit
risk exposures. This yields a comprehensive measure of operational risk that includes model
estimation error, fraud, dishonesty, strategic errors, reputational losses, as well as day-to-day
operational flaws. I validate this measure using fraudulent accounting restatements.
I develop a warning system based on OpCATFIN, setting the threshold on median Op-
CATFIN during the months when 3 month moving average of CFNAI is below -0.7. I then
show that the values of OpCATFIN beyond this threshold will significantly lead to real eco-
nomic downturn. The findings in this paper have regulatory implications. That is, when
examining systemic risk in the financial sector, regulators should focus on operational risk
as the breeding ground for the systemic risk.
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Table 2.1: Data on Risk Factors
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source # of Obs. Data Range
Overall Credit Risk Measure:
RAAA AAA corporate bond yield FRED 1973-2013
RBBB BBB corporate bond yield FRED 1973-2013
Firm Specific Credit Risk Measures:
MV of equity/BV of Assets 1 leverage ratio Compustat 1973-2013
Net Income/Sales Compustat 1973-2013
Ln(Total Assets) Compustat 1973-2013
Interest Rate Risk Measures:
R 3MTB 3 month US Tbill rates FRED 1973-2013
R 10YTB 10 year US Tbond rates FRED 1973-2013
INTGSTDEM193N TBills rates for Germany FRED 1973-2013
INTGSBDEM193N Gov. Bonds rates for Germany FRED 1973-2013
INTGSTJPM193N TBills rates for Japan FRED 1973-2013
INTGSBJPM193N Gov. Bonds rates for Japan FRED 1973-2013
INTGSTGBM193N TBills rates for UK FRED 1973-2013
INTGSBGBM193N Gov. Bonds rates for UK FRED 1973-2013
Exchange Rate Risk Measures:
Exgeus DEM/USD exchange rate WRDS FX File 1973-2013
Exukus GBP/USD exchange rate WRDS FX File 1973-2013
Exjpus JPY/USD exchange rate WRDS FX File 1973-2013
Market Risk Measures:
EquityIndex Canada Compustat Global 1979-2013
EquityIndex France Compustat Global 1990-2013
EquityIndex Japan Compustat Global 1973-2013
EquityIndex UK Compustat Global 1980-2013
EquityIndex Germany Compustat Global 1987-2013
S&P 500 Index Compustat Global 1973-2013
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics.
The first panel reports summary statistics for firm-level variables and second panel reports macro-economic
and financial risk factors.
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
Op risk 178538 -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.82 1.92
NonOp risk 178538 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.06 0.12 0.12 -1.28 6.42
Equity MV/Assets BV 178538 341.45 42.05 78.32 271.40 735.04 744.33 0.12 28828.29
Net Income/Sales 178538 -0.57 -0.04 0.05 0.15 0.21 91.94 -20083.00 192.20
Ln(Assets) 178538 7.53 4.93 6.28 8.82 10.24 2.14 -0.92 15.01
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
Baa spread 485 1.12 0.66 0.79 1.31 1.71 0.47 0.55 3.38
Tbill 3m US 485 5.25 0.17 3.02 7.22 9.09 3.36 0.01 16.30
Tbond 10y US 485 6.95 3.56 4.72 8.45 11.38 2.91 1.53 15.32
Tbill Germany 386 4.89 2.50 3.25 5.99 8.25 2.16 1.65 12.05
Tbond Germany 485 6.09 3.21 4.22 7.92 8.85 2.23 1.20 10.70
Tbill Japan 485 2.51 0.01 0.15 4.91 5.68 2.37 0.00 6.82
Tbond Japan 485 4.30 1.16 1.47 6.95 8.75 2.95 0.53 10.30
Tbill UK 485 7.47 0.57 4.77 10.80 12.96 4.05 0.22 16.18
Tbond UK 485 8.49 3.88 4.89 11.34 13.87 3.84 1.65 17.18
DEM/USD 485 1.91 1.45 1.55 2.25 2.58 0.45 1.24 3.30
GBP/USD 485 0.59 0.46 0.53 0.64 0.69 0.09 0.39 0.91
JPY/USD 485 159.30 93.00 108.32 224.18 266.68 68.02 76.64 305.67
EquityIndex Canada 409 6421.21 2234.51 3275.36 9324.80 12433.50 3862.25 1363.33 14714.70
EquityIndex France 280 3499.69 1860.65 2119.15 4395.86 5485.25 1319.96 1499.00 6625.42
EquityIndex Japan 485 13645.26 4989.09 7994.05 17887.71 23290.96 7311.68 3594.55 38915.87
EquityIndex UK 354 4063.05 1668.80 2420.20 5679.60 6222.50 1710.34 1010.10 6930.20
EquityIndex Germany 307 4204.37 1545.12 2057.28 6004.33 7096.79 2132.80 936.00 8348.84
S&P500 Index 485 635.12 99.93 150.55 1133.58 1362.93 500.42 63.54 1630.74
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of control variables.
Observations mean p10 p25 p75 p90 sd min max
CATFIN 484 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.34 0.41 0.10 0.11 0.69
OpCATFIN 435 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.38
NonOpCATFIN 435 -0.22 -0.33 -0.26 -0.15 -0.12 0.09 -0.63 -0.04
MKT RET 485 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.23 0.16
FIN RET 485 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.23 0.21
CORR 485 0.40 0.23 0.29 0.49 0.57 0.13 0.14 0.66
SIZE 485 13.52 12.42 12.59 14.62 14.90 1.02 11.90 15.18
LEV 485 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.01 0.88 0.95
FIN BETA 472 0.85 0.49 0.71 1.00 1.13 0.23 0.34 1.32
FIN SKEW 485 0.02 -0.65 -0.32 0.38 0.71 0.59 -2.19 2.11
FIN VOL 485 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.29
MKT VOL 485 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.24
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Table 2.4: Validation of operational risk measure
The dependent variable is the restatement dummy. It is equal to 1 if the restatement announcement is
going to occur at month t, and zero otherwise. Propensity score matching is based on size (ln of total
market capitalization of the firm), industry(whether the financial firm is a depository, insurance or securities
firm) and the total equity return over the past one year. The results show that the difference between the
operational risk of the treatment and control groups is significant only in the month before the announcemnt
and not significantly different afterwards.
(t-2) (t-1) (t) (t+1)
Restatement 0.00182 -0.0128∗∗∗ 0.00543 0.00409
(0.43) (-3.07) (1.30) (0.98)
Constant -0.00158∗∗∗ -0.00157∗∗∗ -0.00158∗∗∗ -0.00158∗∗∗
(-15.27) (-15.19) (-15.29) (-15.29)
Observations 173831 173831 173831 173831
Adjusted R2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
t-statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
Table 11: Definition of control variables.
For control variables, I use the same definitions as in Allen et al. (2012).
Variable Definition
CFNAI Chicago Fed National Activity Index, is a monthly index that determines increases and decreases in economic activity
and is designed to assess overall economic activity and related inflationary pressure.
Control Variables
DEF The default spread, i.e., the difference between the BAA-rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds.
TERM The term spread, i.e., the difference between the ten-year T-bond and one-month T-bill yields.
RREL Is the relative short-term interest rate, defined as the difference between one-month T-bill rate and its twelve-month
backward-moving average.
FIN RET The value-weighted average excess returns of all financial firms(i.e., the average excess return on the financial market
index).
FIN VOL The realized monthly volatility of excess returns of all financial firms, defined as the square root of the sum of squared
daily returns in a month.
FIN SKEW The realized monthly skewness of excess returns of all financial firms.
FIN BETA The average market beta of all financial firms estimated from monthly returns over the past five years.
MKT RET The monthly excess return on the CRSP value-weighted index.
MKT VOL The realized monthly volatility of excess returns of the aggregate stock market portfolio, defined as the square root of
the sum of squared daily returns in a month.
CORR The average correlation between excess returns on individual financial firms and excess returns on the financial market
index, and the correlation measurement window is twentyfour months, updated on a monthly basis.
SIZE The natural logarithm of the average market capitalization of firms in the financial sector.
LEV The aggregate leverage in the financial sector defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of the entire financial
sector.
Aggregate Lending (Call Reports)
Total loans
(rcon1400)
The aggregate gross book value of total loans (before deduction of valuation reserves). Beginning in the first quarter of
1984 this item includes rcon 2165, lease financing receivables. The inclusion of this series results in an inconsistency in
the total loan series. We correct by adding lease financing receivables to total loans prior to 1984.
C&I loans
(rcon1600)
Includes commercial and industrial loans to business enterprises.
RealEstate loans
(rcon1410)
Includes all loans, whatever the purpose, secured primarily by real estate as evidenced by mortgages, deeds of trust,
land contracts, or other instruments, whether first or junior liens (e.g., equity loans, second mortgages) on real estate.
Consumer loans
(rcon1975)
Includes all loans, not secured primarily by real estate, to individuals for medical expenses, personal taxes, vacations,
consolidation of personal (nonbusiness) debts.
Future Research
First chapter can be extended as follows.
1. Extant literature find that higher non-interest income (i.e., non-core activities like in-
vestment banking and trading) is associated with a higher contribution to systemic
risk relative to traditional banking (i.e., deposit taking and lending) (see, e.g., Brun-
nermeier, Dong, and Palia, 2012; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Dittmar and Thakor,
2007). Therefore, we can classify the acquisitions into activity diversifying and focus-
ing based on similarity of their business models. This classification methodology will
help investigate whether the business model is a driver of our results.
2. Bond prices provide a more direct measure of default risk relative to stock prices.
Change in stock prices can be driven by many other factors. Therefore, to strengthen
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